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1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that the gender gap in educational attainment has not only decreased
over the past decades, but that in many OECD countries women have overtaken men in terms
of college attendance rates. This observation is puzzling in light of the fact that gender gaps
in labor force outcomes continue to exist (i.e. female labor force participation rates are
lower, women are more likely to work part-time and women experience lower earnings than
men). This suggests that the determinants of educational decisions might differ for men and
women and that –at least for women– labor market returns might not be the only driving
force. A natural candidate for an alternative source of returns is the marriage market (as
suggested by Goldin (1992), Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006) and Bailey and Dynarski
(2011) who document and discuss the “college enrollment puzzle”). Nevertheless, to this
date there is little empirical evidence on whether marriage market considerations play a role
in educational decisions.
This paper aims to contribute to closing this gap by investigating whether marriage
market returns matter for educational decisions and whether the relative weights of labor
and marriage market returns differ by gender. These questions are not only essential for
understanding the driving forces behind educational choices, but also for the effective design
of programs intended to increase schooling and to reduce existing gender gaps (e.g. in
developing countries).
If marriage market considerations are important for educational decisions (i.e. individuals
prefer a more educated or higher earning spouse and if the likelihood of matching with such
a partner increases in their own education), this suggests that increases in the educational
attainment of one gender might have important spillover effects on the other gender. This
implies that if a policy or a shock (for example a labor market shock) were to increase, say,
boys’ education and thus leads to a larger gender gap in education, marriage market returns
might decrease this gap again by providing an additional incentive for girls to increase their
educational attainment as well. Such positive spillovers should be taken into account in the
cost-benefit analysis of different types of policies.
More specifically, the goals of this paper are twofold. First, we want to improve our un-
derstanding of how labor market considerations determine education decisions. In particular,
we use data on subjective expectations that directly reflect how Mexican youths perceive
their labor market prospects (in terms of earnings, and earnings and employment risks) for
different schooling alternatives. Second, we combine this labor market perspective with an
analysis of the role of the marriage market in educational decisions. Finding a good partner
is generally seen as one of the most important problems that individuals face during early
adulthood. Since youths’ educational decisions are likely to influence the set of available
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partners and their attractiveness in the marriage market, it is therefore natural to think that
marriage market considerations might play a crucial role in these decisions.1 Including the
marriage market into our analysis allows us to shed some light on whether there are differ-
ences in the (relative) weights that females and males assign to labor and marriage market
considerations in their educational decisions.
The main challenge in the empirical analysis of educational decisions is the fact that
we cannot directly observe people’s beliefs about their potential returns. Even ex-post we
can only observe the realization of the chosen alternative. Much of the existing literature
on schooling decisions uses earnings realizations to measure (or proxy for) expected returns
to education. This approach relies on strong assumptions about people’s information sets
and about how people form expectations. For example, such an approach has to make
assumptions about whether large shocks to an individual’s earnings (that take place once
the individual has completed her schooling and works) were predicted by the individual ex-
ante, i.e. at the time of the schooling decision. Furthermore, the researcher has to make
assumptions about whether and how an individual takes into account that other individuals,
whose earnings she observes (and uses in forming her own expectations), are typically self-
selected into that education level.
These assumptions are of particular concern in the analysis of gender differences in school-
ing decisions, since there might be important differences in terms of how well boys and girls
are informed about future labor market earnings. For example, in Mexico female college
attendance and labor force participation rates have been increasing in recent years, but
starting from a very low level compared to men. Thus girls might be less well informed
than boys, since they only observe few women with college degrees and even fewer women’s
earnings given their low labor force participation rates. This might affect their expectations
about returns as well as their perceptions about the uncertainty associated with different
education choices, both of which we elicit directly. Moreover, beliefs about future labor
market outcomes depend on an individual’s perception of her own skills and on how these
skills (and other characteristics) affect her future earnings. Thus if, for example, girls are
more likely to underestimate their skills, they are also more likely to underestimate their
future earnings than boys are. For these reasons, we elicit boys’ and girls’ expectations di-
rectly, since what matters for the college attendance decision is each individual’s perception
of her potential returns to schooling (and, more generally, of her labor market outcomes for
different schooling levels).
1For example, by enrolling in college individuals signal their ability and social status and may thereby
become more attractive for potential partners (see, e.g., Lee (2015) for the role of educational attainment
in dating and marriage decisions). Moreover, if college enrollment requires the individual to move from a
village to a city, this may imply a far larger set of potential partners to choose from (see, e.g. Botticini and
Siow (2008)).
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We address our questions in the context of the college enrollment decision. In particular,
we analyze the decision of youths who have completed senior high school to enroll (or not) in
college. We construct measures of expected earnings and perceived earnings and unemploy-
ment risk for different schooling scenarios, to study the extent to which these expectations
affect education choices of male and female youths.
In addition, we provide evidence on the role of returns in the marriage market in education
choices. We pursue two different approaches. First we analyze the role of marriage market
considerations based on marriage market proxies as explained below. Second, we present
results based on direct data on individuals’ beliefs about labor market as well as marriage
market outcomes for different schooling scenarios.
In terms of the first approach, we use two different proxies for marriage market returns:
(i) the ratio of unmarried men to women in the locality of residence to capture the availability
of partners; and (ii) the ratio of unmarried men to women with a certain level of schooling,
if the suitability of the partner depends on having a similar (or higher) education level.
The idea for using these proxies is simple: if the likelihood of finding a (suitable) partner
in the locality of residence is low, leaving the locality to go to college has the benefit of
increasing the chances of finding a (suitable) partner and of improving the outside option
in the case that no partner is found. Due to social norms in Mexico, the link between
schooling and marriage market considerations is likely to be particularly strong for girls,
because parents would be very reluctant to let their unmarried daughter move to a different
city to work and live by herself, while more willing to let her leave for continuing school
(where she can live with classmates). Anecdotal evidence strongly points to the importance
of marriage market considerations in schooling decisions: in Mexico there even exists the
acronym “MMC”s (‘mientras me caso’ ) for girls going to college to find a husband.
Of course one might be worried that our proxies (sex ratios conditional on education
and unconditionally) capture not only marriage market conditions, but also labor market
conditions. In this context, our data on each individual’s expectations about her potential
future labor market outcomes proves very useful to address this concern, since we can analyze
jointly the importance of labor market and marriage market considerations as determinants
of schooling decisions. Moreover, we conduct a number of robustness tests including one in
which we add detailed controls for local labor market conditions (such as local earnings and
unemployment rates by gender and education).
As a second approach, we make use of an additional dataset which contains direct in-
formation on individuals’ beliefs about marriage market outcomes for different schooling
scenarios in addition to labor market expectations. Individuals are asked what they believe
their spouse would earn conditional on them having a high school or a college degree.
Our results indicate that both boys and girls expect high labor market returns to col-
3
lege and perceive lower unemployment and earnings risks for higher education levels. Also
both boys and girls expect their spouse to earn more the higher their own education level.
Moreover, we find that labor market as well as marriage market returns are important de-
terminants of the college enrollment decision. However, boys’ and girls’ preferences differ in
terms of the relative role of the two determinants, in that the relative weight of labor market
versus marriage market returns is larger for boys than for girls.
Our subjective expectations data allow us to address in a rather direct and straightfor-
ward way questions which are complicated to address (without making strong additional
assumptions) when beliefs are not observed. On the other hand, the use of expectations
data is sometimes criticized on the basis of concerns such as endogeneity or ex-post ratio-
nalization. We will discuss these concerns in detail and provide supporting evidence for why
we believe that these issues are not driving our results.
Related literature. Our paper is closely related to the following three strands of the
literature, the literature on the role of people’s subjective expectations in their educational
decisions, the one on gender differences in education and expectations, and the one on
education and marriage market returns.
In recent years there has been a surge in the literature using data on people’s subjective
expectations to understand educational decisions. The seminal paper eliciting subjective
expectations of earnings for different schooling degrees is by Dominitz and Manski (1996).
They illustrate for a small sample of Wisconsin high school and college students that people
are willing and able to answer subjective expectations questions in a meaningful way.2
Papers that investigate the link between subjective expectations of earnings and edu-
cation choices have analyzed school enrollment decisions (see, for example, Nguyen (2008),
Jensen (2010), Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014) and Kaufmann (2014)), high school track
choices (see Giustinelli (forthcoming)) and college major decisions (see, among others, Ar-
cidiacono, Hotz, and Kang (2012), Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2014) and Zafar (2009)).
Another literature has analyzed the role of beliefs about the costs of education by providing
information about loans and fellowships in a randomized fashion (see, e.g., Dinkelman and
Martinez (2014)).
Our paper is most closely related to the first group, which investigates how perceived
returns affect schooling investments. For example, Jensen (2010) finds that his sample of
2See also the survey paper on the use of subjective expectations data by Manski (2004). Since then the
literature has started using data on people’s beliefs in a wide variety of areas, such as, for example, in health
decisions (see, e.g., Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011) and Alvarez and Vera-Hernandez (2013)). Attanasio (2009)
and Delavande, Gine´, and McKenzie (2011) survey the literature that uses data on subjective expectations
in developing countries and find that also in this context individuals are willing to answer the expectations
questions and understand them reasonably well (sometimes with the help of visual aids).
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8th graders significantly underestimate returns to schooling. Informing a random subset
of the youths about higher measured returns leads to a significant increase in perceived
returns and in attained years of schooling. Nguyen (2008) analyzes whether it matters
how such information is transmitted and finds bigger effects on schooling outcomes from
direct quantitative information about higher returns compared to the effects of role models
telling their success stories. Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014) analyze whether youths’ own
or parents’ beliefs about future labor market outcomes are relevant for schooling decisions.
Kaufmann (2014) analyzes the causes and consequences of the large income gradient in
college attendance in Mexico. In particular, data on subjective expectations in combination
with a structural model of schooling choices enable her to analyze to what extent the gradient
can be explained by the poor expecting lower returns to college than the rich, for example
due to ability or information differences.
With respect to those papers the main distinguishing features of our work are the focus on
differences in beliefs and behavior between males and females and the inclusion of marriage
market considerations. Moreover, we also elicit and use information about the risk that
individuals perceive in association with each alternative (such as earnings and unemployment
risk), which might be particularly relevant in the comparison of determinants between boys
and girls, for example because of gender differences in risk aversion.
Gender differences have been documented not only in terms of preferences (such as in
terms of the degree of risk aversion, see, for example, Charness and Gneezy (2012) or in
terms of the willingness to compete, see, among others, Booth and Nolen (2012) and Gupta,
Poulsen, and Villeval (2013)), but also in terms of subjective expectations about future out-
comes (see, e.g., Filippin and Ichino (2005) who show that college students’ beliefs about the
gender gap in earnings are relatively close to the actual observed gap at the beginning of the
career, but underestimated compared to the actual gap at later stages). Differences in expec-
tations can arise, for example, due to actual differences in the labor market (see the survey
articles by Azmat, Guell, and Manning (2006) and Azmat and Petrongolo (2014) and, for
example, in terms of reasons for earnings differences, Castillo, Petrie, Torero, and Vesterlund
(2013) on differences in bargaining and Mengel (2015) on differences in networking) as well
as due to gender differences in self-assessment (see, for example, Dohmen and Falk. (2011))
or differences in probability judgements (see Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Marklein, and Sunde
(2009) for evidence related to financial decisions).
There is a large literature documenting the existence of gender differences in educational
attainment (in terms of years of schooling, but also, for example, in terms of choice of sub-
jects, see Joensen and Nielsen (2015)), in particular in developing countries. Two recent
papers that discuss gender issues related to the role of returns to education and school
choices are Abramitzky and Lavy (2014) and Jensen (2012). Both of them exploit (quasi)-
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experimental changes to returns to school. Abramitzky and Lavy (2014) exploit a policy
change in Israeli kibbutzim which led to a substantial increase in the returns to education.
They find that students in early-reforming kibbutzim increased their investment in edu-
cation and male youths responded particularly strongly. Jensen (2012) examines whether
educational investments in girls in India respond to changes in employment opportunities
that he induces in randomly selected villages through the provision of recruitment services.
While these two papers share with our work the interest in gender differences with respect
to labor market returns, we aim to complement this literature by adding another potential
determinant of education choices, namely marriage market returns.
Very few papers consider the importance of marriage market considerations. The hy-
pothesis that marriage market considerations are an important determinant for individuals’
educational decisions is supported by the descriptive evidence provided in Goldin (1992).
She shows that American women who went to college and graduated between 1945 and 1960
had substantially higher earning husbands. Two recent papers provide causal evidence on
the link between education and marriage market outcomes. Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011)
estimate a number of different non-monetary returns to schooling and show, among other
things, that higher education leads to an increased probability to be married. Kaufmann,
Messner, and Solis (2012) make use of administrative data from Chile and apply a regression
discontinuity design to analyze the longrun effects of being admitted to a more elite univer-
sity. They find substantial returns in terms of women finding a husband who is smarter, from
a better university and from better family background, thus supporting not only the idea
that marriage market returns are important, but also providing evidence on the asymmetry
in the importance of marriage market returns by gender.3 Kaufmann, Messner, and Solis
(2015) show that these marriage market returns can be of first-order importance for the next
generation, i.e. the students’ children.4
In contrast to these papers, our goal is to understand the role of marriage market con-
siderations ex-ante, an aim which is shared by Lafortune (2012). She uses a different ap-
proach to analyze how marriage market conditions affect pre-marital investment decisions.
In particular, she explores whether second generation Americans modify their human capital
acquisition decisions when faced with a shift in the sex ratio of their state-level marriage
market induced by immigration of their own ethnicity. Our paper complements her findings
and provides evidence on gender differences and on the (relative) weight of labor market and
marriage market considerations in educational decisions.
3This asymmetry can be explained by men and women trading off characteristics in potential partners in
different ways, in particular men putting a greater weight on factors less strongly related to cognitive ability,
such as beauty or health. This is supported for example by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) and Lee (2015).
4Also see Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2009) for a structural model on the relationship between education
choices and the marriage market.
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In a recent paper, Wiswall and Zafar (2015) analyze the effect of an information ex-
periment on the intended major choice by NYU college freshmen. In addition to students’
major-specific expectations of labor market returns, they also elicit students’ expectations
regarding the earnings of their (future) spouse and how these expectations depend on the
major. Wiswall and Zafar (2015) find that labor market outcomes are important for the
choice of the major, while spousal earnings connected to specific majors are not. In this
paper we focus on the college enrollment decision and hypothesize that marriage market
considerations might be more relevant in this latter decision problem because people might
meet potential partners at university even if they pursue different majors. Moreover, we are
interested in gender differences in the determinants of college enrollment.
Outline: The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a basic model
of education choices. Section 3 describes in detail the data, in particular the module on
subjective expectations and the construction of the marriage market proxies. Section 4
presents summary statistics, in particular in terms of individuals’ expectations on labor
market and marriage market outcomes and provides evidence on the validity of these data.
Section 5 discusses the main results on the role of labor and marriage market returns for male
and female youths (including a number of robustness tests related to our marriage market
proxies and the data on subjective expectations). Section 6 concludes.
2 Schooling Decisions and Returns to Schooling
The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of the main determinants of education
choices and to analyze whether they differ between boys and girls. For this purpose, we show
how schooling decisions of young poor Mexicans relate to their expectations on the return
and risk to that investment as well as to returns in the marriage market.
2.1 Determinants of enrollment
To analyze the relationship between enrollment and expected returns, one possible approach
would be the construction of a full dynamic optimization model where individuals choose
current activities taking into account current and future benefits and costs of the alternative
decisions (see, for instance, Keane and Wolpin (1997), Todd and Wolpin (2006) and Attana-
sio, Meghir, and Santiago (2011)). Kaufmann (2014) shows how data on people’s subjective
expectations can be used in a simple model of college enrollment choice. Instead of following
this route, we present probit regressions that relate the probability of enrollment to the com-
monly used control variables in the context of schooling decisions (such as ability, parental
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education, income and so forth), and in addition to subjective expectations of earnings and
proxies for returns in the marriage market. In a fully specified model, schooling decisions
are determined by the entire probability distribution of future earnings under alternative
scenarios. Here we assume that the effect of this distribution can be summarized by a few
moments of the distribution of earnings at age 25. Moreover, we control for labor market
conditions through state dummies and –in further robustness checks– we also control for
labor market conditions at the local level, such as average earnings and unemployment rates
by gender and education.
Specifically, to model the decision to enroll in college, having completed senior high
school, we use a latent index model which we estimate on the sample of senior high school
graduates. Denoting with S the college enrollment decision (S = 1 if the individual decides
to attend and S = 0 otherwise), the latent index model for attending college can be written
as:
S =
1 if S∗ ≥ 00 otherwise.
where, (1)
S∗ = α +
2∑
z=1
βzE(log Yz) +
2∑
z=1
γzV ar(log Yz) +
2∑
z=1
δzP
W
z + µR
M +X ′θ + U.
where z = 1, 2 denotes senior high school and college, respectively. The vector X contains
a number of control variables that are likely to affect the schooling decision, ranging from
measures of individual ability to parental background characteristics and θ denotes the vector
of corresponding parameters. In terms of subjective expectation measures E(log Yz) is the
expected value of the distribution of (log) earnings at age 25 for the scenario that degree z
(z = 1, 2) is the highest completed by the youth.
For robustness, we also show specifications including the expected (gross) returns to
college instead of expected log college and high school earnings separately, since the expected
gross return is generally analyzed in the literature as the most important determinant of the
college enrollment decision. We denote the expected (gross) returns to college as ρ, which is
defined as ρ = E(log Y2)− E(log Y1).
V ar(log Yz) denotes the variances of future earnings under different schooling scenarios
and PWz the subjective probability of employment under different scenarios, as discussed
further below. As measures for RM we either use a proxy for marriage market returns or
a direct measure of youths’ beliefs about their future spouses’ earnings conditional on their
own educational degree.
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We obviously expect higher expected log college earnings to have a positive effect on
the decision to attend college, while higher expected log high school earnings (i.e. higher
opportunity costs) should have a negative effect. Focusing on the return to college, we would
expect the return to college relative to senior high school, as perceived by the individual, to
have a positive effect on the decision to attend college.
In addition to the expected return, we also want our empirical model to take into account
the possibility that the riskiness of a given investment might affect schooling decisions. For
this reason, we include in our regressions the variances of the future earnings under different
schooling scenarios V ar(log Yz). Moreover, as the questions on future expected earnings are
conditional on working, we enter the subjective probability of employment under different
scenarios, PWz . One would expect a high perceived earnings risk with a senior high school
degree to have a positive effect on the probability of continuing to college, and a high variance
of log earnings with a college degree to have a negative effect.
In conventional approaches without data on subjective expectations, proxies for ability,
such as GPA and parental education, are supposed to capture differences in the ability to
benefit from high school or college through higher expected returns as well as differences
in psychological costs of attending college (see, e.g., Cameron and Heckman (1998) and
Cameron and Heckman (2001)). However, such variables are only imperfect proxies of the
returns that an individual can obtain from her education. Skills are likely to be multi-
dimensional and are difficult to capture even with good data on test scores. In addition
individuals have idiosyncratic knowledge about these skills. Most importantly, what matters
for the individual’s decision is her perception of her skills and her beliefs about how they affect
future earnings (conditional on her information set at the time of the schooling decision).
This provides a strong rationale for using “perceived” returns and “perceived” risk. We
nevertheless also control for GPA and parental education both of which turn out to be very
important determinants of the college enrollment decision we model. These variables might
be proxying for the probability of completing college and for preferences for education.
To investigate whether marriage market considerations are important for education choices,
we pursue two different approaches. First, we include in the regressions proxies for returns
in the marriage market, RM . Using Census data, we compute the ratio of unmarried men
to women with at least a senior high school degree in the locality of residence. Limited
availability of suitable partners in the locality of residence could constitute an important
push-factor to leave the locality.5 In that case an increased likelihood of finding a (suitable)
spouse or finding a ”higher-quality” (e.g. more educated) spouse would constitute the return
5Edlund (2005) uses a similar argument to explain migration patterns that lead to young women outnum-
bering young men in urban areas. To proxy for marriage market considerations she uses the ratio of men
to women in the municipality of residence and finds supportive evidence for this explanation using Swedish
municipality data.
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of leaving one’s locality to continue schooling.
In Mexico social norms are such that Mexican parents are generally reluctant to let their
unmarried daughter move to a bigger city to work and live by herself, while they are more
willing to let her leave home to attend school and live with classmates. This creates a link
between schooling decisions and marriage market considerations, which is likely to be less
strong for boys, as they could migrate to a bigger city to work and find a spouse. But even
for boys, in the presence of strong patterns of assortative mating, it might be less costly to
find an educated partner at school or college. For this reason we interpret “suitable partner”
in terms of a partner who has a similar education level (or higher) and thus use the ratio of
unmarried men to women with an education level as high or higher than the youth deciding
about schooling.
We construct our proxies for marriage market returns using locality level data because we
believe that this is the appropriate reference area (or “marriage market”) for most youths.
This proxy is more likely to capture people’s actual knowledge about availability of partners
than when using a larger reference area. In fact, using the administrative dataset ”Estadistica
de matrimonios (marriage statistics)” from the Mexican Statistical Institute INEGI, which
contains information on all civil marriages that took place in Mexico in 2005,6 one can show
that 69% of marriages took place between spouses from the same locality. As expected, this
share decreases with individuals education levels (74% of individuals with primary education
or less have a spouse from the same locality, 68% of individuals with secondary education and
59% of college-educated individuals). These figures lend support to our notion of a ”local
marriage market” and is also consistent with our hypothesis that individuals might obtain
a higher schooling degree to meet individuals from different localities and get married.7
Our proxy for marriage market returns could, potentially, hide different effects. One
key concern is that the sex ratio (conditional on education or unconditionally) captures
labor market conditions that affect individuals decisions to attend college. In this context,
our data on expectations about labor market outcomes is very useful, since what matters
for an individual’s college enrollment decision is her beliefs about her future labor market
outcomes conditional on having a college degree or not, and we have direct measures of these
beliefs. For this reason we can analyze jointly the role of labor market and marriage market
considerations in college attendance decisions. Since one might still be worried that the sex
ratio could pick up current labor market conditions, which might be relevant for the college
decision on top of the beliefs of future own labor market outcomes, we carefully control
6According to Census data from 2000 around 92% of marriages are civil marriages, while 8% are only
religious marriages. Thus our data contains information on the large majority of marriages.
7Moreover, using the Mexican longitudinal data ”Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS)”, we show that
few individuals who migrate to obtain a higher schooling degree return to their locality to live and get
married there (less than 16%).
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for labor market conditions at the local level.8 We make use of different measures of local
labor market statistics based on Census data (as discussed in more detail in the following
section), and corroborate the validity of these measures using the Mexican National survey
of occupation and employment ENOE.9. In particular, we add measures of average earnings,
of unemployment rates and of partial employment and underemployment rates by gender
and schooling degree at the local level. We show that our results are robust to adding these
controls. Moreover, we find that individuals’ beliefs about their own future labor market
outcomes are important determinants of their education choice, while general labor market
conditions are substantially less important once individuals’ labor market expectations are
controlled for.
A second important concern are potential ’peer’ effects. We address this concern in two
ways. First, we control directly for the fraction of men and women with a college degree in
the locality, to see if this affects the coefficient on the sex ratio.10 Second, we also consider an
alternative proxy for the marriage market return, which should not suffer from the concern
that it can be confounded with educational peer effects: the ratio of unmarried men to
women without constraining the measure to a specific education level. Also this measure
might be more appropriate, if the youth (for example, the male youth) cares less about the
education level of the spouse.
Our second measure of marriage market returns relies on eliciting youths’ beliefs about
the earnings of their future spouse conditional on their own educational degree. These data
thus allow us to use a more direct measure of “marriage market returns” and results based
on this measure can therefore lend further support to the validity of our findings based on
marriage market proxies.
To examine the question of gender differences in the determinants of schooling, we com-
pletely interact each regressor with a male and a female dummy to test for differential effects.
8Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) and Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) have shown the
importance of taking into account local labor market conditions instead of labor market conditions at a
higher level of aggregation.
9We cannot use data from the ENOE survey directly to compute local labor market variables, since too
few of the localities in our main dataset Jovenes can be matched
10When constructing our control variable for potential peer effects, we consider both married and un-
married women (men) who went to college as a fraction of all women (men) in the locality of residence (in
contrast to the sex ratio that takes into account only unmarried men and women with at least a high school
degree), since we want to control for potential peer effects in the college enrollment decision which could
arise from observing others who went to college.
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3 Data
The conditional cash transfer program Oportunidades, previously known as PROGRESA,
has introduced a new component known as Jo´venes con Oportunidades in 2002/3. The data
we use was collected in 2005 as part of the evaluation of this new program component.
In addition to standard variables, the survey contained a detailed subjective expectation
module which we use extensively. In this section, we describe the data and its structure. We
also describe in some detail the module used to elicit information on subjective expectations
and report some evidence on the quality of these data.
3.1 The Survey
The evaluation survey of Jo´venes con Oportunidades was conducted in the fall 2005. Jo´venes
con Oportunidades provides an additional grant to youths in the last three years of high
school (preparatoria). This grant is deposited into a bank and can be accessed only upon
graduation, if the recipient engages in one of several activities (such as going to college or
starting a micro enterprise). Alternatively, the recipient has to wait for a year during which
time the amount, about US$300, accumulates at the market interest rate.
The primary sampling units of the evaluation survey are individuals who have just grad-
uated from senior high school or from junior high school and who are beneficiaries of Jo´venes
con Oportunidades. To enter this program, individuals have to be in their last year of ju-
nior high school (9th grade) or attend senior high school (10 to 12th grade), they have to
be younger than 22 years of age, and they have to be from a family that benefits from
Oportunidades.
The survey consists of a family questionnaire and a youth questionnaire administered to
each household member aged 15 to 25. As a consequence, the youths for whom we have
data are not only the primary sampling units but also their siblings, provided they are aged
15 to 25. In total we have information on around 23,000 youths. The questions in the
youth questionnaire were addressed directly to the youth. However, if a specific youth was
not present during the interview, the module was answered by the main respondent, who is
generally the mother.
It is important to keep in mind that the overall sample includes all youths aged 15 to
25, regardless of their schooling status. In our analysis we concentrate only on students who
just finished grade 12 (senior high school graduates) and decide about enrolling in college or
not (around 2500 observations).11 We use the data on the siblings sample for a number of
11Unfortunately, we lose nearly 60% of observations when merging our data with Census data to construct
marriage market proxies on locality level, since Census information is only available for part of the localities
in which the youths of our sample live (for a more detailed description, see section 3.5). In section 4.1 we
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robustness exercises on the expectations data.
The survey provides detailed information on demographic characteristics of the young
adults, their schooling levels and histories, their junior high school GPA, and detailed in-
formation on their parental background and the household they live in, such as parental
education, earnings and income of each household member, assets of the household and
transfers/remittances to and from the household. The youth questionnaire contains a sec-
tion on individuals’ subjective expectations of earnings as discussed next.
3.2 The Expectations Module
The subjective expectations module was designed to elicit information on the individual dis-
tribution of future earnings and the probability of working for different scenarios about the
highest completed school degree. The module starts with a simple explanation of probabili-
ties. In particular, individuals are shown a ruler, graded from zero to one hundred, which is
then used to express the probability of future events. The example that is used to illustrate
the concept of probability is the event of rain the following day.
After explaining the use of the ruler to express probabilities and having practiced that
with the rain example, the interviewer moves on to discuss future earnings and the probability
of working under different schooling scenarios. For our cohort of senior high school graduates
the following two scenarios are considered: that the students stops at senior high school and
that the student goes on to college and completes it.
For each of the two scenarios, the youth is then asked questions about the probability of
working at the age of 25 and about future earnings at age 25. For example, in the case of
the second scenario for a senior high school student, the questions are:
1. Assume that you complete College, and that this is your highest schooling degree. From
zero to one hundred, how certain are you that you will be working at the age of 25?
2. Assume that you complete College, and that this is your highest schooling degree. As-
sume that you have a job at age 25.
(a) What do you think is the maximum amount you can earn per month at that age?
(b) What do you think is the minimum amount you can earn per month at that age?
(c) From zero to one hundred, what is the probability that your earnings at that age
will be at least x?
compare individual and family background characteristics as well as people’s expectations for the full sample
and the subsample for which we have Census data.
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where x is the midpoint between maximum and minimum amount elicited from questions
(a) and (b) and was calculated by the interviewer and read to the respondent. These ques-
tions were included in the youth questionnaire and therefore are available for every youth
in the household aged 15 to 25. When a specific youth was not present, these questions
were answered by the mother (referring in the expectation questions to the specific child not
present). This poses potential selection issues that we discuss at length below.
These types of subjective expectations questions have been used extensively in a variety
of contexts (see, e.g., the survey papers by Manski (2004), Attanasio (2009) and Delavande,
Gine´, and McKenzie (2011)). The latter two survey the literature that uses data on subjective
expectations in developing countries and find that individuals are willing to answer the
expectations questions and understand them reasonably well. In section 4 we discuss that –
also in our context– respondents seem to have understood the questions and that the data
pass a number of internal and external validity tests.
In what follows, we relate educational decisions to subjective expectations. This is pos-
sible because of the timing of the survey. The Jo´venes survey was conducted in Octo-
ber/November 2005, that is two or three months after high school and college had started
and enrollment decisions had been made.
While the timing of the survey (which occurred just after the school enrollment decision
had been taken) allows to use the expectations data to estimate an enrollment model, it
raises the potential concern that individuals might try to rationalize their choices. If this
were to be the case, individuals who decided to enroll in college would rationalize their choice
by stating higher expected returns to college (that is higher college earnings and/or lower
expected high school earnings), and those, who decided not to enroll, would state lower
expected returns to college. This would lead to a more dispersed cross-section of returns
after the decision compared to before the enrollment decision.12
We use this argument to check whether ex-post rationalization introduces biases in expec-
tations. In particular, we look at the expectations data of the siblings of our main subjects,
that is we can compare the cross sectional distribution of the expectations of our senior high
school graduates to the expectations of the cohort of youths who are one year younger (just
starting grade 12 at the time of the survey in October/November). If the older youths are
ex-post rationalizing their choices, we would expect a cross-sectional distribution of expected
earnings and returns that is more spread out for the cohort of senior high school graduates
who have decided already whether to enroll in college or not, compared to the distribution of
the cohort that is one year younger and just starting grade 12. The same reasoning should
12This is true unless people switch positions in the distribution in such a way that the resulting cross-
section looks exactly the same as before. This can only be the case if people with low expected returns to
college decide to enroll in college and now state high returns to college and vice versa.
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hold for perceptions of the probability of working. In section E we discuss this issue at length
and present evidence that our main results cannot be explained by ex-post rationalization.
Moreover, we address this concern by comparing the results of this first survey to re-
sults based on data from an additional survey we conducted several years later to elicit
expectations of labor market and marriage market returns (as discussed in section 3.5). The
additional survey elicited youths’ expectations about labor and marriage market outcomes
ex-ante, i.e. while the youths attended their last year of senior high school in 2010/11. We
resurveyed those youths one year later in 2011/12 after their decision to continue schooling
and enroll in college or to stop school. Thus results based on these supplementary data do
not suffer from the problem that expectations are elicited after choices have been made.
3.3 Calculation of Expected Earnings, Perceived Earnings Risk,
and Expected Gross Returns to Schooling
We use the answers to the three survey questions (2(a)-(c)) described above, together with
some additional assumptions, to compute moments of the individual earnings distributions
and expected gross returns to high school and college. We are interested in the individual
subjective distribution of future earnings f(Y z) under two possible scenarios of final educa-
tion attainment: senior high school (z = 1) and college (z = 2). The survey provides, for each
individual, information on the support of the distribution [yzmin, y
z
max] and on the probability
mass to the right of the midpoint, yzmid = (y
z
min+y
z
max)/2, of the support, p = Pr (Y
z > yzmid).
Thus we need an additional distributional assumption, f(·), in order to be able to calculate
moments of these individual earnings distributions, using the three pieces of information on
yzmin, y
z
max and p. Given such an assumption on f(.), we can compute all the moments of
any function of future earnings under different scenarios we are interested in. For example,
the expected value of log future earnings for each individual and each scenario (z = 1, 2)
will be given by E(lnY z) =
∫ yzmax
yzmin
ln yfY z(y)dy.
For many of the specifications we estimate below, we consider the (gross) returns to
college. We compute these as the difference between expected log college earnings and
expected log senior high school earnings, ρ = E(ln(Y 2))− E(ln(Y 1)).13
In Attanasio and Kaufmann (2008), we use three different distributional assumptions,
step-wise uniform, bi-triangular and triangular (compare Guiso, Jappelli, and Pistaferri
(2002)). The last two assumptions give more weight to the middle of the support and
less to the extremes. The first, instead, implies a relatively large value for the total variance.
We rule out the possibility that the density function is U-shaped, giving more weight to
13Notice that, as we have no information on the covariance of earnings under different scenarios, we
cannot compute the variance of the return. For this reason, to capture the risk aspect of education choices
we consider the variance of (log) earnings.
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the extremes. In our companion paper, we show that the first moment of the individual
distribution is extremely robust with respect to the underlying distributional assumption,
while the second moment is obviously larger for the step-wise uniform distribution that puts
more weight on extreme values. In this paper we present results based on the triangular dis-
tribution, but we perform robustness checks using the other two distributional assumptions
and point out differences if they occur.
3.4 Potential Sample Selection Issues
As discussed above, the interviewer visited the primary sampling units and their families in
October and November 2005 and interviewed the household head or spouse using the family
questionnaire and youths between age 15 and 25 using the youth questionnaire. If a youth
was not present, the household head or spouse answered the Jovenes questionnaire as well.
As a result, for almost half the sample, the questions on the subjective distribution of future
earnings were not answered by the youth herself. Instead mothers stated their expectations
about future earnings of her child(ren) that are not present during the interviewer’s visit.
Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) use these data to analyze the intra-household decision
process, that is they investigate whose expectations matter for schooling decisions, the ones
of the mother or the ones of the youth. They show that in terms of the college attendance
decision youths’ own expectations play the major role. For that reason, we will be using
the expectations held by the youths in the following analysis, that is we use the subsample
of senior high school graduates for which the youths answered the expectation questions
themselves. Since the respondent was not randomly determined, we address the concern of
sample selection bias as follows: we use a standard Heckman selection correction approach
(see Heckman (1979)) adjusted to a non-linear context, that is we estimate jointly a latent
index model for college attendance and a sample selection equation.
To achieve non-parametric identification of such a selection model, we need one or more
variables that determine whether the question is answered by the youth rather than the
mother and that, plausibly, do not affect the schooling decision directly. For such a purpose,
we use information on the timing of the interview (the time of day of the interview, whether
it took place on a weekday or weekend and whether it took place during weeks of holiday or
not). We find that, in our sample, youths are significantly more likely to be at home (and
thus able to answer the expectation questions themselves) during evenings on weekends. In
addition, the indicator for holiday weeks is a strongly significant determinant of who is the
respondent (see Table D.1 in the Online Appendix).
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3.5 Data on Marriage Markets Returns
To analyze the importance of marriage market considerations as a determinant of college
enrollment decisions, we pursue two different approaches. First, we use a proxy based on
the availability of (suitable) potential partners in the locality of residence. Second, we rely
on direct data on individuals’ beliefs of marriage market returns.
Marriage market proxy: To proxy for the returns that education might have in the
marriage market, we measure the ratio of unmarried men to women in the locality of residence
of the youth in the sample. We construct the ratio of unmarried men to women who are in
a similar age range as the youth, that is age 18 to 30 and provide evidence on how robust
results are based on alternative age ranges. We assume that high school graduates decide
based on the prevalent sex ratio of unmarried men and women of that age range.14
Due to data constraints, we do not observe the prevalent sex ratio in 2005, but only in
2000 based on Mexican Census data from the year 2000 (“XII Censo General de Poblacion
y Vivienda”by the Mexican statistical institute, INEGI), for which information is available
at the locality level.15 Having information at the locality level is important, because our
“marriage market” proxy is most likely to capture people’s knowledge about availability of
partners in the case of a small reference area (“marriage market”). As discussed in section 2.1,
evidence based on match rates of individuals from the same locality and based on migration
patterns, support the assumption that the locality of residence is the correct reference area
for most of the youths.
Unfortunately, this strategy has the drawback that Census information is only available
for part of the localities in which the youths of our sample live. Therefore we lose close
to 60% of observations of our original sample of senior high school graduates. We compare
summary statistics of the two samples in terms of expectations and individual and family
background characteristics in section 4.2 below and provide robustness checks on whether
our results are still externally valid for the Jovenes sample.
14For descriptive statistics on the marriage market in Mexico, such as the degree of assortative mating,
see the Online Appendix section A and Table A.1.
15The sex ratio from the year 2000 should be a reasonably good proxy for the relevant sex ratio for our
cohort of high school graduates if they either look at the prevalent sex ratio at age 18 and there is some
persistence in the sex ratio or if the sex ratio they observe in their youths for those older cohorts who already
date plays a role in terms of affecting their beliefs about the availability of suitable partners in their locality.
Using Mexican Census data from the year 2010, we show that the sex ratio is relatively persistent in that
the correlation between the sex ratio in 2000 and in 2010 (i.e. 10 years later) is around 0.3. Moreover, using
a measure for 2000 instead of 2005 should introduce noise and might thereby bias our estimates downwards.
Thus the true effects might even be bigger than the ones we find.
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Beliefs about marriage market returns: Five years after the implementation of the
survey ”Jovenes con Oportunidades”, we conducted a pilot study on youths from Progresa
families in junior and senior high school and used the opportunity to include questions on
individuals’ beliefs about labor and marriage market outcomes related to different hypothet-
ical schooling scenarios. In particular, in the academic year 2010/11, we collected baseline
data on these youths including a module on their beliefs, while we resurveyed them in the
following academic year 2011/12 to learn about their schooling decisions one year later.
We make use of the cohort of youths who were in their last year of senior high school
in 2010/11 and who decided (or not) to enroll in college in 2011/12. Due to budgetary
constraints the pilot study was conducted on a relatively small sample of youths and due to
the eruption of drug violence in the academic year 2011/12, we were not able to follow up
on part of the youths, so that –focusing on the cohort of high school graduates– we end up
with only 76 observations.
The first survey round in 2010/11 contained a module with questions on individuals’
expectations related to different outcomes for different schooling scenarios. In particular,
we asked the same questions on labor market outcomes (probability of work, minimum and
maximum earnings and probability of earnings above the midpoint) as discussed in section
3.2 (see survey questions 1 to 2 (c)) with the only exception that individuals are asked for
outcomes at the age of 30 instead of 25.
In addition we added the following question supposed to elicit individuals’ beliefs about
marriage market outcomes. Again we considered the scenario that the students stops at
senior high school and that the student goes on to college and completes it.
For each of the two scenarios, the youth is then asked the following questions about their
future spouse’s earnings. For example, in the case of the second scenario the question is:
3 Assume that you complete College, and that this is your highest schooling degree. As-
sume that you are married or cohabiting at the age of 30. How much do you think will
your spouse (or partner) earn per month?
We present descriptive statistics of these additional data on labor and marriage market
expectations in section 4.3 and compare it to the data based on the Jovenes survey.
3.6 Data for Local Labor Market Conditions
To control more carefully for labor market opportunities which might be correlated with the
sex ratio of unmarried men to women, we compute a series of measures of (un)employment
and partial/underemployment rates and of earnings at the locality level (by gender and
education). In particular, we rely on the same data used to calculate the proxy for marriage
market concerns (as discussed above), namely the Mexican Census from 2000.
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We construct local labor market controls following the definitions of the Mexican Sta-
tistical Institute (INEGI) who compute labor market statistics based on the Mexican labor
market survey, the “National survey of occupation and employment” (ENOE).16 The first
measure we use is the unemployment rate, which is computed by dividing the number of
individuals unemployed by the size of the economically active population (see detailed def-
initions in the Online Appendix) and which –according to the Census– is around 1% for
women and 2% for men (compared to 3% for both women and men based on ENOE).
While a large fraction of the population in Mexico (and other Latin American countries)
work in the informal sector, few people who seek work do not find any work. Thus unem-
ployment rates are low, but underemployment and partial employment are a problem in that
people work fewer hours than they would like to work. For that reason a commonly used
measure in this context is the “unemployment and partial work rate” (or “Tasa de ocupacio´n
parcial y desocupacio´n”) based on people who are either unemployed or working less than
15 hours in the week of reference. The figures for the unemployment and partial work rates
based on the Census basically coincide with those from the employment survey ENOE, that
is around 15% of women are unemployed or partially employed, while the value is around
7% for men.
Conditional on education, the figures are as follows: 17% of women with less than sec-
ondary education are unemployed or partially employed compared to 13% of women with
secondary education and 9% among women with more than secondary education. For men,
these figures are 7%, 8% and 5%, respectively. In terms of monthly earnings, women with
secondary education earn on average 1870 Pesos, while women with more than secondary
education earn 3190 Pesos. For men the figures are 2440 Pesos and 6300 Pesos.
4 Descriptive Statistics
Before using the data on subjective expectations to model schooling choices, we describe the
general patterns and provide some evidence on data quality. We also discuss some of the
econometric issues involved with the use of these data.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics: Characteristics of the Youth
Table 1 reports summary statistics of individual and family background characteristics for
our sample of senior high school graduates. We present results separately for male and female
16We cannot use data from the ENOE survey directly to compute local labor market variables, since only
few of the localities in our main dataset “Jovenes” can be matched. Instead, we use ENOE (and the relevant
documentation of ENOE) to corroborate the validity of our labor market variables based on the Census data
(by comparing summary statistics of the labor market variables based on the two data sets).
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youths and report whether differences are significant. In the first three columns of Table 1,
we present summary statistics for the full sample of high school graduates, while in columns
4 to 6 we present summary statistics for the subsample of youths respondents, which is the
relevant sample for our analysis (as discussed in section 3.4).
We show statistics for both full sample and sample of youth respondents for two reasons:
First, we want to show how the subsample of youth respondents compares to the full sample
in terms of characteristics. Second, we want to show that boys and girls are very similar
in both the full sample and the subsample (once we have controlled for potential sample
selection problems). Testing for gender differences in the youth sample requires to correct
for potential sample selection problems, since the selection process might have been different
for boys and girls. We use a standard Heckman selection correction and use variables that
capture the timing of the interview as exclusion restriction (see section 3.4).
Due to space constraints, we just summarize the evidence from Table 1 by saying that
the features of the sample reflect that we are working with families that are beneficiaries of a
welfare program targeted to the poorest sector of Mexican society. The observed differences
between girls and boys conform with our expectations and confirm findings of other empirical
studies, for example the fact that girls outperform boys at school. The gender differences
we find are very similar for the full sample and for the subsample of youth respondents (for
a detailed discussion of Table 1, see Online Appendix section B). We now turn to analyze
the differences in subjective expectations.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics: Subjective Expectations
In Table 2, we present summary statistics for the variables derived from the subjective expec-
tations questions. The top two panels of the Table report expected log earnings and expected
(gross) returns. The bottom two panels, instead, focus on perceived earnings and employ-
ment risk for two different schooling degrees, senior high school and college. We summarize
these measures separately for male and female youths and determine if there are significant
differences between boys’ and girls’ expectations for the sample of youth respondents, while
correcting for potential sample selection using a standard Heckman approach as discussed
in section 3.4 and in the last section.
Not surprisingly, but reassuringly, expected log earnings increase in schooling level. Gross
returns to college –measured as the difference between expected log earnings of the two
consecutive schooling degrees, high school and college– are large (as they are in terms of
realized earnings, see the Online Appendix section C). Male youths expect slightly higher
earnings and lower returns consistent with a gender earnings gap that decreases in schooling
level as observed in actual earnings data from Mexico.
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One might be surprised that the gender gap in expected earnings is not significant. This
is due to the fact that girls and boys differ somewhat in terms of their family characteristics
(as discussed in Section 4.1). Girls tend to come from slightly more privileged and educated
families, which are characteristics that tend to be positively related to expected earnings.
Thus controlling for those characteristics, there is a significant gender gap in terms of high
school earnings (as shown in the Online Appendix in Table C.2 ).
Standard deviations of log earnings are one possible measure of (perceived) earnings risk
and commonly used for measuring risk in the case of observed earnings. It is important to
point out that having information on the individual earnings distributions (e.g. in the form
of minimum, maximum and probability above the midpoint) allows us to derive a measure
of “true” risk, as perceived by the individual, while using the variability of observed earnings
data will confound risk with unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, observed variability will
not distinguish between predicted and unpredicted changes.
Perceived earnings risk, as measured by the standard deviation of logs, decreases with
education and is lowest for the expectations of earnings conditional on having a college
degree. At the same time the probability of work increases with education. Thus lower
income risk could be another important motivation, in addition to higher expected earnings,
for achieving higher schooling. Male and female youth respondents perceive a very similar
level of earnings risk and similar probabilities of working at age 25.17
As discussed in sections 3.5 and 3.6, to construct our proxies of marriage market returns
and to control for local labor market conditions, we need to match our data from the Jovenes
survey with Mexican Census data which contains information at the locality level, but not
for all localities. For this reason, we lose about half of our original sample when we perform
this match. While this does not bias our results for the localities which are included in
our sample, the results are not necessarily representative anymore for Mexican high school
graduates whose families are beneficiaries of Progresa/Oportunidades (which is the sample
we start of with). To understand whether and in what dimensions this matched sample
might differ from our original sample, we compare labor market expectations and individual
and family background characteristics for the subsample of Jovenes that can be matched
with Census Data versus the subsample that cannot be matched with Census information.
Table B.1 in the Online Appendix shows that differences in terms of youths’ labor market
expectations between the Jovenes sample that can be matched with Census data and the
subsample that cannot be matched are small and mostly insignificant. Also in terms of
individual and family background characteristics differences are mostly small, for example
17In addition to second moments, one can consider higher moments of the distribution. Looking at the
skewness, one finds that, on average, individual earnings distributions are left-skewed (i.e. the probability to
have earnings above the midpoint is larger than 0.5) and increasingly left-skewed with increasing schooling
level.
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college enrollment rates are very similar for boys and somewhat larger in the matched sample
for girls. But there are some significant differences in terms of family background, in that
individuals in our matched sample come from somewhat more privileged families. Mothers
are slightly more educated in the matched sample, per capita income is higher, the number
of siblings is somewhat lower, and families are less likely to have the father in the household.
One potential reason for these differences might be that individuals from smaller (poorer)
localities tend to be overrepresented in the Jovenes data compared to the Mexican Census
and thus the matched data contains more individuals from larger localities (and in this sense
tends to be more representative of Mexican high school graduates in general).18 In section
5.3 we show that our results also hold for the poorer subsample of our matched dataset, i.e.
they do not depend on focusing on the more privileged families in our Jovenes sample.
In Online Appendix Section C we provide evidence on the validity of the expectations
data we use, by comparing summary statistics of expected labor market earnings to realized
earnings and by showing how expected earnings and realized earnings compare in terms of
their correlation with individual and family background characteristics.
In a nutshell, the evidence based on the validity checks suggests that our sample of
Mexican youths understand the expectation questions and give meaningful answers. Even
though the goal was not to show how rational or well-informed people are (or how people form
expectations), we can tentatively conclude the following: We do not find clear evidence that
girls are less well-informed about potential labor market outcomes. First, girls’ perceived
earnings uncertainty (i.e. the perceived standard deviation of log earnings based on the
elicited individual distribution of earnings) is comparable to the one of boys. Second, girls’
expectations about earnings are of a similar order of magnitude as observed earnings (as is
the case for boys). Third, expectations vary with characteristics in a way one would expect.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics: Supplementary Data on Labor and
Marriage Market Expectations
In this section we present summary statistics on individual and family background char-
acteristics of the youths in our second main dataset and provide descriptive statistics on
their subjective expectations on labor and marriage market outcomes. Table B.2 shows that
youths in this supplementary data are relatively similar to the Jovenes sample, for example
in terms of college enrollment rates, mothers’ education, GPA of junior high school, number
of siblings etc, but this sample is somwhat more urban (for a more detailed discussion, see
Online Appendix Section B).
18Since we only have information on the size of localities in the Census data, we do not know the size
for those localities that could not be matched, but the difference in characteristics points towards the above
mentioned conclusion in terms of size.
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Table 3 provides summary statistics on youths’ labor and marriage market expectations.
Both male and female youths expect earnings conditional on a college degree to be substan-
tially higher than earnings conditional on a high school degree (for boys log earnings are 8.6
for college versus 8.1 for high school, for girls log earnings are 8.5 to 7.8). There is a gender
earnings gap, in particular for high school earnings (significant on 5%).
Compared to the expectations of the youths in the Jovenes sample, earnings expectations
are higher for this sample for both schooling degrees and both genders.This is most likely due
to the fact that this second survey elicited beliefs about future earnings at age 30 instead of
25 and to the fact that the survey was conducted five years later and earnings of high-skilled
individuals have grown further. Also the perceived probability of work with a high school
degree is higher for this sample (0.77 versus 0.67).
In terms of spouses’ earnings, youths expect their spouses to have close to 30% higher
earnings if they themselves have a college degree instead of a high school degree. Girls expect
higher earnings for their husbands than for themselves conditional on their own schooling
degree, which is again consistent with an expected gender earnings gap.
5 Schooling Decisions and Returns to Schooling
In this section, we show how college attendance decisions of young poor Mexicans relate to
their expectations about labor market returns and risks as well as to returns in the marriage
market. Moreover, we are interested in whether the determinants of education choices differ
between boys and girls. Therefore we estimate the schooling decisions jointly for boys and
girls and interact all regressors with a gender dummy, but present the coefficients for boys
and girls in two separate columns in the result tables.19
5.1 Labor Market Returns
While the goal is to model the college attendance decision using equation (1) in the following
section, we first relate the probability of college enrollment to labor market outcomes, that
is expected returns to college and perceived unemployment and earnings risk (under the two
different schooling scenarios) and a set of controls.
To test whether imposing a specific functional form by including expected returns (defined
as the log difference between college and high school earnings) instead of expected earnings
separately by schooling level, we show results based on expected log earnings in columns 1
19As discussed in section 4.2, we address the potential sample selection problem (which is only a problem
in the case of the first main dataset used, i.e. the Jovenes sample) by using a Heckman selection correction in
a non-linear context. In particular, we estimate jointly a selection equation and the main college attendance
equation.
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and 2 (for boys and girls, respectively) and based on including expected returns to college
in columns 3 and 4 (for boys and girls, respectively).
Table 4 shows that –in terms of individual characteristics– academic performance, as
measured by the GPA, is an important determinant of the decision to attend college for
both boys and girls. Past academic performance is important since it is a measure of the
psychological costs or benefits of getting further education and it captures the likelihood
of being able to complete the following schooling levels (compare Stinebrickner and Stine-
brickner (2012)). Interestingly, having a highly educated mother is more important for girls’
decision to attend college than for boys, while boys are more likely to go to college if there
is no father in the household. Also parental income appears to be more important for girls
than boys in the decision to attend college.
The key results of Table 4 are as follows: Boys’ expectations about returns to college
are strongly significant predictors for their decisions to enroll in college (significant on 1%).
Similarly, boys’ expectations about log earnings conditional on schooling are highly signif-
icant (on 1 %) and have the expected sign, that is higher expected high school earnings,
i.e. higher opportunity costs, decrease the likelihood to go to college, while higher expected
college earnings increase the likelihood to enroll in college.
The coefficient on girls’ expected returns is only about a third of the size of boys’ co-
efficient, it is significant at 10% and significantly smaller than the one for boys. In terms
of the effect of expected log earnings, the signs of the coefficients are again as expected,
i.e. higher expected high school earnings decrease the likelihood of college, higher expected
college earnings increase this likelihood, though the coefficients are not significant at conven-
tional levels. Again the coefficient of girls on both expected high school and college earnings
are smaller than for boys (significant on 5% for high school earnings and p-value of 0.16
for college earnings). Coefficients on our measures of the perceived probability of work or
earnings risk are not significant.
One way to interpret our estimates on expected log earnings is in the context of an
expected utility framework with log utilities in that individuals compare their expected
utility with a college degree and with a high school degree as the highest degree and decide
about enrolling in college based on this comparison.
As we will discuss in detail in section E, it is unlikely that these results are driven by
people rationalizing their choices ex-post. Although we control for potential self-selection
problems because of non-randomness of who responds to the expectation questions, it is
worthwhile to point out that self-selection does not appear to be a problem (we never reject
that the correlation between the error terms of selection equation and main equation is zero).
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5.2 Marriage Market Returns: Proxies
In the last section, we found differences in the importance of expected labor market returns
between boys versus girls. In what follows, we want to explore further how determinants of
schooling decisions differ for boys and girls, and consider a second potentially very important
determinant of schooling: returns in the marriage market.
In the following, we first relate the college decision to our two proxies of marriage market
returns and controls (see the upper panel of Table 5). Then we investigate jointly the im-
portance of labor market and marriage market considerations for boys and girls, as modeled
in equation (1) (see the lower panel of Table 5).20
The upper panel of Table 5 shows that for girls the coefficient on the ratio of unmarried
women to men conditional on education is significant and has the expected sign: fewer
available suitable partners in the locality of residence (i.e. many women per man) increase
the likelihood of girls to attend college (see column 2). For boys, the coefficient on the
analogous ratio of unmarried men to women is not significantly different from zero (column
1). The difference between boys and girls of the coefficient on the marriage market proxy is
significant at the 5% level. Columns 3 and 4 show the same pattern for the proxy without
conditioning on education (see the upper panel of Table 5).
The results of the upper panel of Table 5 suggest that marriage market considerations
are indeed important for girls’ college attendance decision, while this determinant appears
to play a smaller (or no) role for boys. Of course, we might be concerned that our proxies
for marriage market returns could, potentially, hide different effects. One key concern is
that –in addition to marriage market effects– the sex ratio in the locality of residence (con-
ditional on education or unconditionally) captures labor market conditions which in turn
affect individuals’ decisions to attend college.
The lower panel of Table 5 therefore combines the analysis of the role of labor market and
marriage market outcomes in college attendance decisions and confirms our previous two key
findings. In terms of labor market outcomes, the coefficients on expected log college earnings
(expected log high school earnings) are again highly significantly positive (negative) for boys
and the magnitude of the coefficients is basically unchanged. Also the coefficients on girls’
expected log earnings of college and high school are unchanged and still significantly smaller
in magnitude than for boys. In terms of marriage market considerations, both proxies are
still significant predictors of girls’ college attendance decision also after controlling for labor
market expectations. For boys, both proxies are insignificant and significantly different from
20While we include the same control variables as in Table 4 in all the following regression tables, we do not
display the coefficients on those controls in the main paper due to space constraints, but they are available
upon request. Moreover, in Table D.2 in the Online Appendix, we show the same analysis as in Table 5, but
including expected returns to college instead of expected log earnings for high school and college (similarly
for Tables 6 and D.3, as discussed in the following section).
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the ones for girls.
To conclude, we find that labor market as well as marriage market returns are important
determinants of the college enrollment decision. However, boys’ and girls’ preferences differ
in terms of the relative role of the two determinants, in that the relative weight of labor
market versus marriage market returns is larger for boys than for girls.
5.3 Robustness of the Results on Marriage Market Proxies
Peer effects: A first important concern is related to the fact that our proxy for marriage
market returns (the sex ratio of unmarried men to women conditional on having at least a
high school degree) could also capture ”peer” effects. We address this issue in two ways.
First, we consider not only the sex ratio conditional on education, but also an alternative
proxy: the ratio of unmarried men to women without constraining the measure to a specific
education level (so that this ratio should not capture any peer effects with respect to the
schooling decision). As discussed, this measure might also be more appropriate, if the youth
(for example, the male youth) cares less about the education level of the spouse. Second, we
control directly for the fraction of men and women with a college degree in the locality, to
see if this affects the coefficient on our marriage market proxy.
Tables 5 and 6 show that results point in the same direction for both proxies conditional
on education and unconditionally: for girls, the coefficients on our marriage market proxies
are always significant and significantly different from the ones of boys.
Controlling for potential peer effects directly, that is controlling for the fraction of women
(men) in the locality who have a college degree, our results remain unchanged. The upper
panel of Table 6 shows that the marriage market proxy conditional on education actually
becomes larger and more strongly significant when controlling for potential peer effects. At
the same time our proxy for potential peer effects is strongly significant for girls, i.e. girls
are more likely to go to college if they live in a locality of highly educated women. These
two robustness checks suggest that the correlation we find between schooling decisions and
our marriage market proxies is not driven by peer effects in education.
Local labor market conditions: The second key concern is that our proxy for mar-
riage market returns might be correlated with current local labor market characteristics
which might affect the college enrollment decision, even after controlling for individuals’
expectations about their idiosyncratic future labor market outcomes. For this reason, we
add detailed controls for labor market conditions at the local level. In particular, we use
Mexican Census data to construct controls for average earnings, unemployment and partial
employment rates at the local level by gender and by educational degree (as discussed in
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section 3.6).
The lower panel of Table 6 shows that –after controlling for individuals’ beliefs about
their own potential labor market outcomes– coefficients on local labor market conditions
are mostly insignificant, with the exception of local partial/unemployment rates for the
college-educated which has a significant negative effect on boys’ decision to enroll in college.
More importantly, our conclusions in terms of the role of expected earnings and marriage
market considerations is unchanged. Both labor market expectations and marriage market
considerations are important determinants in college enrollment decisions.
Moreover, our results suggest that there are some important gender differences with
respect to their relative roles. While for boys expected returns to college seem to be par-
ticularly important, expected labor market outcomes appear less important for girls. For
girls on the other hand, marriage market considerations seem to play an important role in
the college enrollment decision, consistent with anecdotal evidence (compare the Mexican
acronym “MMC”s (‘mientras me caso’ ) for girls going to college to find a husband).
We conducted further robustness checks (i) related to the fact that we can only match part
of our sample to Census data to construct sex ratios, (ii) to test for robustness with respect
to the age range used to construct sex ratios as proxies for the (net-) supply of marriageable
partners, (iii) to test for robustness with respect to different measures of unemployment
rates, (iv) to test for the importance of the sex ratio in larger localities and (v) to test for
interaction effects between expected returns and the probability of working. As we show in
the Online Appendix Section E, our results are robust to using different specifications and
different samples, while interaction effects do not seem to be important. In the next section
we show results based on elicited expectations on labor market as well as marriage market
outcomes.
5.4 Marriage Market Returns: Subjective Expectations
After providing evidence on the importance of marriage market considerations in college
enrollment decisions based on two marriage market proxies, we now move to an analysis based
on direct data on individuals’ beliefs about marriage market and labor market outcomes.
In this section we rely on data from an additional survey which we conducted in 2010/11
and 2011/12. We focus on the cohort of youths who were in their last year of senior high
school in 2010/11 (which is when we elicited their subjective expectations), and who were
then enrolled college (or not) in the following year 2011/2012 (which is when we resurveyed
them to gather information on their educational decisions). As in the previous sections we
are interested in the role of expected log earnings conditional on high school and college and
the role of the probability of working with high school or college degree.
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More importantly, we now include measures of individuals’ expectations of future mar-
riage market outcomes conditional on highest schooling degree. In particular, individuals’
were asked about what they think their spouses would earn when they are 30 conditional
on them having a high school (or college) degree (see section 3.5 for details on the survey
questions and section 4.3 on descriptive statistics). Thus we include two variables, expected
log earnings of the spouse conditional on the individual him/herself having a high school
degree and conditional on having a college degree.
These data also have the following important advantage over using marriage market
proxies: In the case of the proxies, we have information on marriage market opportunities
in the locality where the high school graduates live, but no direct evidence on the marriage
opportunities when the individuals leave for college. We assume that the likelihood to meet
highly educated potential partners go up when the individual enrolls in college, but we do not
have direct data on that. When we use individuals’ beliefs about marriage market outcomes
conditional on highest schooling degree, we instead have direct information on both “states of
the world”, i.e. marriage outcomes with a high school degree and with a college degree. Thus
results based on individuals’ beliefs about marriage market outcomes can help in supporting
our interpretation that it is “marriage market returns” that matter.
Table 7 displays the result of regressing the decision to enroll in college on individual and
family background characteristics (gender, high school GPA, mothers’ education, presence
of the father in the household, number of siblings and whether the household has access to
a health insurance, which we use as a proxy for how privileged the household is since we do
not have direct information on household income). The coefficients on the controls have the
expected sign, but only some of them are significant due to the small number of observations.
The main results of Table 7 are the following: In column 1 we pool male and female
youths and control for gender in the regression. We find that higher expected log high
school earnings significantly decrease the likelihood to enroll in college, as one would expect
(the coefficient is significant on 1%). The coefficient on expected college earnings is not
significant. In terms of the role of marriage market returns, we find that higher expected
earnings of the spouse conditional on the individual him- or herself having a college degree
significantly increases the likelihood to enroll in college (significant on 5%).
In order to analyze whether the role of the determinants differs by gender, we interacted
our expectations variables with a gender dummy (instead of fully interacting all included
variables because our sample size is small). Since coefficients on labor market expectations
were similar for male and female youths, we show results based on interacting the expected
marriage market outcomes with gender (see columns 2 and 3) and find that the coefficient
on expected log earnings of the spouse conditional on college is only significant for female
youths (on 5%) and is about 50% larger in size for girls than for boys.
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To conclude, our results suggest an important role of expected labor market and marriage
market outcomes as determinants of college enrollment decisions lending further support to
our findings discussed in the previous section based on marriage market proxies. Moreover,
using both approaches we find that boys’ and girls’ preferences differ in the relative weight
they give to labor market versus marriage market outcomes.
5.5 Robustness: Subjective Expectations and Endogeneity (Ex-
Post Rationalization)
In this section we discuss concerns that are sometimes raised with respect to data on subjec-
tive expectations, that is potential problems of endogeneity due to reversed causality (ex-post
rationalization). We first conduct a test of whether ex-post rationalization appears to be
present in our main data based on the Jovenes survey. Second, we discuss how our data
based on the additional survey we conducted can help us address this concern and provide
supporting evidence on the robustness of our results.
The term “ex-post rationalization” describes the behavior of people who state beliefs
to justify their choices (ex-post), that is the decision affects the beliefs instead of beliefs
affecting the decision. For example, an individual might eat a whole cake and justify this
decision by stating the belief that otherwise the cake would have gone bad. In the context of
this paper, one might be worried that people decide to go to college for reasons other than
expected labor or marriage market returns, and that they justify this decision by stating
high expected returns.
Test of ex-post rationalization: To test the possibility that our respondents answer the
expected return questions to justify their choices ex-post, since the survey on expectations
was conducted two-three months after the schooling decision, we conduct the test that we
discussed in section 3.2 comparing the cross-section of expected earnings for our cohort of
interest (i.e. students who had just graduated from senior high school and decided to enroll
in college or not before the survey was conducted) with a cohort that is one year younger
(and thus just starting the last grade of high school). Due to space constraints we discuss
the full set of results of our tests in the Online Appendix section F. Based on those test
results we do not find evidence for ex-post rationalization.
Further evidence based on the second main dataset used: Moreover, in the previous
section 5.4 we provided further support for our findings by relating expectations about labor
and marriage market returns which we elicited ex-ante to youths’ college enrollment decisions,
for which individuals were resurveyed one year later after the decision had been made. Thus
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ex-post rationalization is much less of a concern for those results, which confirm our previous
findings.
Lastly, recent papers have shown causal effects of earnings expectations on educational
decisions by conducting randomized information experiments, such as the one by Jensen
(2010) on the beliefs of eight-graders in the Dominican Republic or the paper by Wiswall
and Zafar (2015) on college major decisions (as discussed in the introduction).
To conclude, we have applied different strategies and provided different pieces of evidence
in support of the interpretation that individuals’ earnings expectations affect their educa-
tional decision. Our results show that not only expected labor market expectations matter
in college enrollment decisions, but also marriage market returns, in particular for female
youths.
6 Conclusion
The results of this paper help to shed light on several important questions about the deter-
minants of investment in human capital. In particular, we have analyzed how expectations
of future returns affect schooling decisions of Mexican youths. In doing so we consider not
only the expected monetary returns but also the risks involved with such choices and the
returns on the marriage market.
Our main result is that labor market as well as marriage market returns are important
determinants of the college enrollment decision. However, boys’ and girls’ preferences differ
in terms of the relative role of the two determinants, in that the relative weight of labor
market versus marriage market returns is larger for boys than for girls.
Direct data on people’s beliefs enable us to be agnostic about differences in information
sets and ways of forming expectations between boys and girls. Avoiding strong assump-
tions about how people form expectations and what information they possess is crucial for
our analysis, since results on gender differences in determinants of schooling might be very
sensitive to these assumptions.
The role of marriage market returns as a determinant of educational decisions has not
received much attention in the literature so far. To analyze the importance of marriage
market considerations, we used proxies for marriage market returns as well as direct data
on individuals’ beliefs about marriage market outcomes conditional on highest schooling
degree. Both approaches led to the same conclusion, that is marriage market returns are an
important determinant of the college enrollment decision, in particular for girls.
Our results have important policy implications for the design of programs aiming at
increasing schooling, such as conditional cash transfer programs, fellowship programs, in-
formation campaigns etc. For the effective design of such programs, it is indispensable to
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understand what are the key determinants of schooling choices and whether there are gender
differences in the role of these determinants.
Our paper adds to the literature on subjective expectations in illustrating that –also in
developing countries, at least conditional on a certain level of education– people seem able
and willing to respond meaningfully to questions about their perceptions of future earnings
and employment and that these data can improve our understanding of important economic
decisions, such as investment into human capital.
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Appendix
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Individual and Family-Background Characteristics (Jovenes
data matched with Census data)
Sample Total Youth
Boys Girls Diff Boys Girls Diff
Mean/(SD) (P-Val) Mean/(SD) (P-Val)
Enrollment Rate: College 0.307 0.333 ( 0.326) 0.268 0.267 ( 0.707)
(0.462) (0.472) (0.444) (0.443)
GPA of Jr HS (Scale 0-100) 80.272 82.885 (0.000) 80.172 83.462 ( 0.000)
(8.221) (9.688) (6.422) (8.038)
Mother’s Educ - Primary 0.814 0.787 (0.286) 0.822 0.804 ( 0.884)
(0.400) (0.413) (0.405) (0.407)
Mother’s Educ - Jr HS 0.163 0.171 (0.697) 0.164 0.151 ( 0.133)
(0.369) (0.383) (0.371) (0.358)
Mother’s Educ - Sr HS or more 0.024 0.042 (0.069) 0.015 0.044 ( 0.051)
(0.152) (0.201) (0.086) (0.195)
Per Cap Income - 5 to 10k 0.327 0.307 ( 0.453) 0.309 0.287 ( 0.907)
(0.470) (0.462) (0.463) (0.453)
Per Cap Income - above 10k 0.247 0.222 (0.302) 0.264 0.210 ( 0.537)
(0.432) (0.416) (0.442) (0.408)
No Father in Household 0.216 0.209 (0.764) 0.253 0.220 ( 0.222)
(Mother Single/Sep/Div) (0.412) (0.407) (0.435) (0.415)
Number of Siblings 2.660 2.828 (0.107) 2.401 2.715 ( 0.237)
(1.827) ( 1.798) (1.758) (1.773)
Ratio Unmarried Men/Women 1.109 1.109 (0.988) 1.110 1.109 ( 0.375)
(0.204) (0.232) (0.211) (0.236)
Ratio Unmarried Men/Women 1.057 1.074 (0.615) 1.025 1.067 ( 0.570)
(With Sen HS) (0.539) (0.633) (0.555) (0.670)
Observations 547 690 269 404
Notes: The first three columns (“Total”) refer to the whole sample including youth and mother respondents. In our analysis we will be using
the “Youth” sample (columns 4 to 6). The difference between boys’ and girls’ characteristics in column 6 corrects for potential sample selection
using a standard Heckman selection correction. As exclusion restriction we use variables that capture the timing of the interview, which are strong
predictors for whether the youth is present when the interviewer arrives to answer the questions on subjective expectations herself.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Subjective Expectations of Future Labor Market Outcomes
(Jovenes data matched with Census data)
Boys Girls Diff
Mean/(Std Dev) (P-Val)
Exp Log Earnings
- Senior HS 7.633 7.532 (0.199)
(0.471) (0.516)
- College 8.288 8.272 (0.605)
(0.461) (0.496)
Exp Return
- College 0.655 0.735 (0.025)
(0.359) (0.436)
Exp Std Dev Log Earn
- Senior HS 0.064 0.062 (0.534)
(0.041) (0.038)
- College 0.052 0.054 (0.874)
(0.032) (0.034)
Prob of Work
- Senior HS 0.676 0.670 (0.844)
(0.180) (0.189)
- College 0.817 0.823 (0.516)
(0.174) (0.156)
Observations 269 404
Notes: The difference between boys’ and girls’ expectations in column 3 corrects for potential sample selection.
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Subjective Expectations of Future Labor and Marriage
Market Outcomes (Supplementary Data)
Boys Girls Diff
Mean/(Std Dev) [P-Val]
Labor Market Expectations
Exp Log Earn - HS 8.138 7.848 0.290
(0.554) (0.595) [0.031]
Exp Log Earn - Coll 8.641 8.517 0.124
(0.685) (0.494) [0.365]
Prob of Work - HS 0.785 0.759 0.026
(0.207) (0.822) [0.600]
Prob of Work - Coll 0.802 0.799 0.003
(0.168) (0.224) [0.958]
Marriage Market Expectations
Exp Log Wage Spouse - HS 8.187 8.218 -0.030
(0.537) (0.436) [0.792]
Exp Log Wage Spouse - Coll 8.479 8.501 -0.022
(0.643) (0.521) [0.871]
Observations 36 40
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Table 4: College Attendance Choice: Labor Market
Dependent Variable College Attendance
Labor Market Expectations
Exp Log Earn Exp Return
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Labor Market Exp
Exp Log Earn - HS -0.885*** -0.252
(0.261) (0.174)
Exp Log Earn - Coll 0.689*** 0.272
(0.259) (0.179)
Expected Return - College 0.781*** 0.276*
(0.246) (0.161)
Prob of Work - Sr HS 0.148 0.409 0.060 0.443
(0.599) (0.474) (0.590) (0.476)
Prob of Work - College -0.298 0.234 -0.497 0.350
(0.637) (0.581) (0.617) (0.574)
Var of Log Earn - HS 7.939 14.791 6.054 14.551
(11.891) (10.306) (11.757) (10.429)
Var of Log Earn - Coll 1.588 -4.658 2.888 -3.613
(19.528) (13.999) (18.981) (13.993)
GPA of Jr HS (0-100) 0.053*** 0.029*** 0.043*** 0.035***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
No Father in Household 0.510** -0.221 0.517** -0.219
(0.240) (0.175) (0.241) (0.176)
Mother’s Educ - Jr HS 0.210 0.120 0.187 0.111
(0.236) (0.199) (0.233) (0.199)
Mother’s Educ - HS/Coll -4.810 1.140*** -4.930 1.160***
(5.001) (0.348) (4.776) (0.350)
Per cap Income - below 5k 0.337 -0.259 0.336 -0.258
(0.219) (0.186) (0.217) (0.188)
Per cap Income - above 10k -0.059 0.436** -0.071 0.442**
(0.235) (0.177) (0.232) (0.178)
Observations 1237 (564) 1237 (564)
Log Likelihood -1172.237 -1173.297
Sample Sel: Error Corr (P-Val) -0.220 (0.672) -0.205 (0.706)
Notes: Table displays coefficients and standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Excl. categories: father in household, mother’s
education primary or less, per capita income between 5000 and 10000 pesos.
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Table 5: College Attendance Choice: Labor Market and Marriage Market
Dependent Variable College Attendance Decision
Marriage Proxy 1 Marriage Proxy 2
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Without Labor Market Expectations
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women (Sr HS) -0.150
(0.138)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men (Sr HS) 0.176*
(0.098)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women -0.755*
(0.455)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men 0.580**
(0.280)
Controls for Ind. and Background Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1237 (564) 1237 (564)
Log Likelihood -1170.670 -1170.384
Sample Sel: Corr of Errors (P-Val) -0.330 (0.504) -0.387 (0.404)
With Labor Market Expectations
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women (Sr HS) -0.15
(0.135)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men (Sr HS) 0.173*
(0.100)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women -0.544
(0.451)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men 0.592**
(0.287)
Exp Log Earn - HS -0.864*** -0.265 -0.808*** -0.275
(0.264) (0.170) (0.265) (0.168)
Exp Log Earn - Coll 0.634** 0.263 0.639** 0.261
(0.256) (0.173) (0.257) (0.171)
Controls for Ind. and Background Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Prob. of Work and Var. of Log Earn Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (Censored) 1237 (564) 1237 (564)
Log Likelihood -1159.147 -1159.478
Sample Sel: Corr of Errors (P-Val) -0.417 (0.350) -0.462 (0.292)
Notes: Table displays coefficients and standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Excl. categories: father in household, mother’s
education primary or less, per capita income between 5000 and 10000 pesos.
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Table 6: College Attendance Choice: Labor and Marriage Market - Local Labor Market
Conditions
Dependent Variable College Attendance Decision
Marriage Proxy 1 Marriage Proxy 2
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Peer Effects
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women (Sr HS) -0.111
(0.145)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men (Sr HS) 0.203*
(0.106)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women -0.473
(0.474)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men 0.558*
(0.300)
Exp Log Earn - HS -0.869*** -0.308* -0.828*** -0.310*
(0.263) (0.178) (0.265) (0.177)
Exp Log Earn - Coll 0.693*** 0.340* 0.701*** 0.330*
(0.263) (0.184) (0.264) (0.182)
Frac of Coll Educ Men (Women) 1.268 3.272*** 1.219 2.838**
(1.237) (1.223) (1.229) (1.221)
Observations (Censored) 1237 (564) 1237 (564)
Log Likelihood -1154.600 -1155.981
Sample Sel: Error Corr (P-Val) -0.207 (0.685) -0.242 (0.624)
Local Labor Market Conditions
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women (Sr HS) -0.140
(0.155)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men (Sr HS) 0.193*
(0.109)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women -0.772
(0.534)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men 0.651**
(0.323)
Exp Log Earn - HS -0.923*** -0.328* -0.875*** -0.347*
(0.268) (0.181) (0.269) (0.182)
Exp Log Earn - Coll 0.779*** 0.363* 0.795*** 0.357*
(0.271) (0.189) (0.272) (0.188)
Frac of Coll Educ Men (Women) 0.549 3.586*** 0.439 3.259**
(1.375) (1.304) (1.375) (1.304)
Average Census Earn - HS 0.203 -0.003 0.213* -0.002
(0.127) (0.037) (0.127) (0.038)
Average Census Earn - Coll -0.012 -0.002 -0.016 -0.023
(0.033) (0.070) (0.033) (0.070)
Partial/Unempl Rate Men - HS -0.012 0.002 -0.013 -0.002
(0.018) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008)
Partial/Unempl Rate Men - Coll -0.032* -0.013 -0.035* -0.016
(0.018) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011)
Observations (Censored) 1237 (564) 1237 (564)
Log Likelihood -1146.448 -1146.890
Sample Sel: Error Corr(P-Val) 0.001 (0.999) -0.038 (0.944)
Notes: Table displays coefficients and standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Excl. categories: father in household, mother’s
education primary or less, per capita income between 5000 and 10000 pesos.
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Table 7: College Attendance Choice: Expectations on the Labor and Marriage Market
(Supplementary Data)
Dependent Variable College Attendance Decision
Labor and Marriage Market Exp
All Boys Girls
Labor Market Exp
Exp Log Earn - HS -1.304*** -1.335***
(0.457) (0.498)
Exp Log Earn - Coll -0.384 -0.387
(0.544) (0.581)
Prob of Work - HS 0.127 0.081
(0.908) (0.885)
Prob of Work - Coll 0.548 0.591
(1.193) (1.215)
Marriage Market Exp
Exp Log Earn Spouse - HS 0.476 0.339 0.880
(0.551) (0.768) (0.683)
Exp Log Earn Spouse - Coll 1.111** 0.891 1.375**
(0.464) (0.612) (0.645)
GPA - HS 0.329 0.263
(0.247) (0.247)
Male 0.612 9.207*
(0.430) (5.261)
No Father in Household 0.281 0.333
(0.371) (0.386)
Mother’s Yrs Educ 0.015 0.026
(0.049) (0.050)
Health Insurance 0.749** 0.889**
(0.365) (0.377)
Number of Siblings -0.070 -0.065
(0.098) (0.099)
Observations 76 76
Log Likelihood -34.754 -34.085
Joint Sig: Exp (P-Val) 0.0319 0.0432
Notes: Table displays coefficients and standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Excl. categories: female, no health insurance,
father in household.
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ONLINE APPENDIX: NOT FOR PUBLICATION
i
A Background Information
A.1 Local Labor Market Controls: Definitions
• Economically active population: persons of 15 years or more that were attached to an
economic activity or were looking for a job in the reference week.
• Working population: persons of 15 years or more that in the week of reference made
some economic activity during at least one hour. It include the working population
that had job but did not work for a temporary reason and people that work without a
wage.
• Unemployed: persons of 15 years or more that looked for a job in the week of reference
because they were not attached to any economic activity or job.
• Partial work: people that worked less than 15 hours in the week of reference.
A.2 Assortative Mating in Mexico
Table A.1: Assortative Mating in Mexico
Husbands’ Education
Prim or Less High School College Total
Women’s Education
Primary educ or less 64.75% 33.32% 1.93% 100%
High school 15.04% 74.83% 10.13% 100%
College or more 2.68% 28.62% 68.70% 100%
Total 25.38% 56.29% 18.33%
Notes: Table based on administrative data on marriage in Mexico (for details, see section 3.5).
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B Descriptive Statistics
Detailed discussion of Table 1 In the youth sample, around 27% of male and female high
school graduates enroll in college (see columns 4 and 5). For the whole sample, attendance
rates are slightly higher, around 30% for males and 33% for females (gender differences are
not significant). Mexico has reached the stage where boys’ and girls’ educational attainment
is very similar, while for example in the US girls have overtaken boys in terms of college
attainment (see, e.g., Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006) and Bailey and Dynarski (2011)).
In what follows, we make use of data on GPA (grade point average between 0 and 100)
of junior high school as a proxy for academic achievement. Table 1 shows that girls have a
significantly higher GPA than boys (in both the total sample and the youth sample). This
is consistent with empirical evidence for many countries that girls outperform boys at school
(see, e.g., Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006)).
To control for parental education as one of the most important determinants of children’s
schooling choices, we use information on mothers’ years of completed schooling in the form of
three education dummies: for primary education, junior high school and senior high school
or more. About 80% of mothers have only some primary education, while around 16%
have attended junior high school and only 4% attended senior high school or university.
Mothers are slightly more likely to have a senior high school degree (or a higher degree)
in the case of girls. This is likely due to the fact that i) the focus of this paper is on a
cohort of high school graduates (i.e. relatively highly educated youths) and ii) that mothers’
education is particularly strongly correlated with girls’ education (see, e.g., Black, Devereux,
and Salvanes (2005) and see Table 4 according to which mothers’ education is more strongly
related to girls’ decision to enroll in college than boys’ decision). For this reason girls who
have managed to obtain a high school degree come from relatively more educated families
(in terms of mothers’ education) compared to boys.
We create three per capita income categories, where the thresholds are equal to twice
and four times the minimum wage.21 About 45-50% of the sample is in the lowest income
category (that is yearly per capita income is below 5000 pesos) and thus relatively poor,
reflecting the fact that our sample only consists of Oportunidades families. About 30% are
in the second highest category (5000 to 10000 pesos) and the remaining 20-25% in the top
income category. There are no significant gender differences (neither in the full nor youth
sample).
21Per capita parental income is constructed using parental income –such as parents’ labor earnings, other
income sources such as rent, profits from a business, pension income etc and remittances– divided by family
size. Median yearly per capita income is 6066 pesos (approximately 606 US$). We add the income measures
in the form of dummies to allow –in a flexible way– for nonlinear effects of income. The reason for the chosen
income thresholds is their approximate correspondence with eligibility requirements for receiving fellowships
(even though they are quantitatively not very important, see Kaufmann (2014)).
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We also control for the presence of the father in the household, that is whether the mother
is single, separated, divorced or widowed, to see if this has an effect of children’s schooling
decision (on top of a resource effect that we aim to control for directly by including measures
of parental income divided by family size). In around 20-25% of households, no father is
present. While this fraction is slightly higher in the youth sample, there are no significant
gender differences in either sample.
Another potentially important factor in schooling decisions is the number of siblings.
Boys have around 2.4 to 2.6 siblings, girls have a slightly larger number of siblings (2.7-2.8),
but gender differences are not significant.
Turning to our proxies for marriage market returns, the ratio of unmarried men to women
is 1.11 for boys and girls, while the ratio of unmarried men to women with at least a senior
high school degree is 1.05 and slightly larger in the full sample and for girls (difference
insignificant).
We can summarize the evidence from Table 1 by saying that the features of the sample
reflect that we are working with families that are beneficiaries of a welfare program targeted
to the poorest sector of Mexican society. The observed differences between girls and boys
conform with our expectations and confirm findings of other empirical studies, for example
the fact that girls outperform boys at school. The gender differences we find are very similar
for the full sample and for the subsample of youth respondents.
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Table B.1: Summary Statistics: Jovenes Sample Matched with Census Data versus Subsam-
ple that cannot be Matched
Summary Statistics
Boys Girls
Census No Census Diff Census No Census Diff
Mean/(SD) [P-val] Mean/(SD) [P-val]
Exp Log Earn - HS 7.633 7.607 0.025 7.538 7.511 0.026
(0.471) (0.520) [0.539] (0.516) (0.497) [0.468]
Exp Log Earn - Coll 8.288 8.249 0.039 8.273 8.196 0.076
(0.461) (0.485) [0.328] (0.496) (0.470) [0.029]
Exp Return Coll 0.655 0.642 0.013 0.735 0.685 0.050
(0.359) (0.360) [0.661] (0.436) (0.374) [0.090]
Var of Log Earn - HS 0.064 0.066 -0.002 0.062 0.064 -0.002
(0.041) (0.039) [0.485] (0.038) (0.041) [0.449]
Var of Log Earn - Coll 0.052 0.056 -0.004 0.054 0.054 0.000
(0.032) (0.035) [0.147] (0.034) (0.037) [0.938]
Prob of Work - HS 0.676 0.650 0.026 0.680 0.647 0.033
(0.180) (0.166) [0.068] (0.189) (0.186) [0.014]
Prob of Work - Coll 0.817 0.824 -0.006 0.833 0.816 0.017
(0.174) (0.148) [0.640] (0.156) (0.165) [0.130]
Enrollment Rate: College 0.268 0.223 0.045 0.267 0.206 0.061
(0.444) (0.417) [0.210] (0.443) (0.405) [0.044]
GPA of Jr HS (0.100) 80.172 81.769 -1.598 83.462 82.545 0.917
(6.422) (6.895) [0.004] (8.038) (6.664) [0.085]
Mother’s Educ - Jr HS 0.164 0.115 0.049 0.151 0.110 0.041
(0.371) (0.319) [0.087] (0.358) (0.313) [0.088]
Mother’s Educ - HS/Coll 0.015 0.022 -0.007 0.045 0.013 0.031
(0.121) (0.148) [0.512] (0.207) (0.115) [0.010]
Per Cap Income - 5 to 10k 0.309 0.204 0.105 0.287 0.251 0.036
(0.463) (0.403) [0.004] (0.453) (0.434) [0.262]
Per Cap Income - above 10k 0.264 0.121 0.143 0.210 0.144 0.066
(0.442) (0.327) [0.000] (0.408) (0.352) [0.016]
No Father in HH 0.253 0.121 0.132 0.220 0.107 0.113
(0.435) (0.327) [0.000] (0.415) (0.309) [0.000]
Number of Siblings 2.401 2.799 -0.398 2.715 2.746 -0.031
(1.758) (1.905) [0.009] (1.773) (1.716) [0.807]
Observations 269 314 404 374
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Descriptive statistics of the supplementary data Table B.2 shows that youths in
this supplementary data have very similar college enrollment rates to the Jovenes sample
(around 27%). Youths’ average GPA of senior high school is 7.8 out of 10 points (for the
Jovenes sample we have information on GPA of junior high school, on which youths scored
80 points out of 100). Mothers have on average 6 years of education (72% have less than
junior high school, 22% have a junior high school degree and 5% have a senior high school
degree or more, i.e. individuals in this sample have mothers that are slightly more educated
than the youths from the Jovenes sample). At the same time, the youths of this sample are
less likely to live in a household with the father present. In particular, 31% of boys and 45%
of girls live in a household without father present (compared to 25% in the Jovenes sample).
This is likely due to the fact that this survey is more urban than the Jovenes sample.22 In
terms of number of siblings the two sample are again quite similar (youths have around 2.8
siblings).
Table B.2: Summary Statistics of Controls in Supplementary Data
Summary Statistics
Boys Girls Diff
Mean/(Std Dev) [P-Val]
Enrollment Rate: College 0.278 0.250 0.028
(0.454) (0.439) [0.787]
GPA HS (0-10) 7.706 7.930 -0.022
(0.772) (0.732) [0.197]
Mother’s Yrs Educ 5.861 6.075 -0.214
(3.863) (2.749) [0.780]
Health Insurance 0.639 0.525 0.114
(0.487) (0.506) [0.322]
No Father in Household 0.306 0.450 -0.144
(0.467) (0.504) [0.201]
Number of Siblings 3.083 2.675 0.408
(2.075) (1.670) [0.346]
Observations 36 40
22The fact that this figure is larger for girls is consistent with what people have found in the literature,
see, e.g. Moretti and Dahl (2008), though the difference in our case is not significant.
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C Data Validation: Expected Earnings, Realized Earnings and
Individual Characteristics
The goal of this section is to present evidence that people are able to understand questions
on their subjective expectations of earnings and give meaningful answers. For that purpose
we first compare the data on subjective expectations we are using to earnings data from the
Census. Second, we relate the expected value of future earnings to a number of individual
and family background characteristics. Since the evidence provided in this section is meant
to convince the reader of the validity of our data, but is not essential for the main goals of
this paper, we defer the relevant tables to the Online Appendix.
As we will discuss in detail below, it is probably impossible to establish whether the
elicited expectations are ‘rational’. But, in the following sense, it is not too important
for the goals of this paper: for modeling education choices what matters is whether the
elicited expectations reflect the subjective expectations that people base their decisions on.
In that case data on people’s earnings expectations can help us improve our understanding
of educational decisions. We therefore aim to convince the reader that people are indeed
able to give meaningful answers to the questions on their earnings expectations and that the
elicited expectations are able to capture –at least to some degree– the beliefs that people
base their decisions on.
In the following analysis, we are particularly interested in the pattern for male versus
female youths. We compare earnings expectations to Census earnings using Census data of
the year 2000 and compute average log earnings (by gender and by schooling degree) in the
municipality of residence for each youth in the sample. While the expectations questions
refer to earnings at age 25, we use earnings of individuals who are between 25 and 30 years
old to get a sufficiently large sample size for each municipality.
While the comparison between the subjective expectations data and the Census data is
certainly informative, if nothing else to check whether the subjective expectations data are
roughly of the same order of magnitude, a direct comparison and a formal test of equality
between the two would be misleading. There are many reasons why the Census data and
the subjective expectations would be different. First, the former refer to a specific year
(2000) and are therefore affected by specific aggregate shocks that might have been relevant
in that year. To test some version of Rational expectations, one would need several years of
realizations to average out aggregate shocks. Second, the data refer to individuals who were
between 25 and 30 in 2000 and therefore belong to a different cohort from the individuals
whose expectations were elicited in our survey (who are around 18 in 2005, and who were
asked about their expected earnings when they are 25). Finally, the Census data report
realizations for individuals who self-selected into a specific education level and do not contain
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“counterfactual” earnings, which are instead elicited in the expectations questions.
‘rational’ is probably impossible. And, in a sense, it is not too important: for modeling
education choices what matters is whether the elicited expectations reflect the subjective
expectations that people base their decisions on.
Appendix Table C.1 presents mean expected earnings based on the distribution of earn-
ings and Census earnings for different schooling degrees, for boys and girls respectively. It
shows that boys’ and girls’ expectations about future earnings are clearly of the same order of
magnitude as observed Census earnings. Both boys and girls expect future college earnings
(that will be realized in 2012) to be higher than college earnings that are observed at the
time of the Census in 2000. Girls also expect their future high school earnings to be slightly
higher than female high school earnings that are observed in 2000, while boys believe them
to be very similar to contemporaneous high school earnings. Boys and girls thus expect
high future returns to college and they expect them to be larger than the ones observed in
2000. These beliefs are consistent with the continuation of previous trends of rising returns
to college.
According to Appendix Table C.1, girls expect lower high school earnings than boys and
similar college earnings, suggesting that the expected gender gap is smaller than the observed
gender gap. However, as discussed in Section 4.1, girls and boys differ somewhat in terms
of family characteristics. In particular, girls tend to come from slightly more privileged and
educated families, which are characteristics that tend to be positively related to expected
earnings. Thus controlling for those characteristics, there is a significant gender gap, in
particular in terms of high school earnings (as shown in Table C.2 and as discussed below).
The second interesting exercise consists of relating the expected value of future earnings
to a number of individual and family characteristics and –in addition– to compare this
to how realized earnings relate to those characteristics. For this comparison, we focus on
characteristics for which we have information in the Jovenes and in the Census data, which
are used for the regression of expectations and earnings realizations, respectively. Such an
exercise serves the purpose of a validation exercise. In particular, we expect people to draw
inferences about their own potential earnings from what they observe from others. Thus
finding that expectations vary with observable characteristics in a way similar to observed
earnings lends support to their validity. We refer the interested reader to Attanasio and
Kaufmann (2008) for a more detailed discussion.23
Appendix Table C.2 shows both expected earnings and realized earnings are positively
correlated with the individual being male, pointing towards a gender gap in realized as well
23It is important to keep in mind that our goal is not to explain how people form expectations. Our data
clearly does not allow us to conduct such an ambitious exercise given the fact that we have do not have panel
data of expectations and only small sample sizes.
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as in expected earnings (as discussed before). Moreover, expected and realized earnings
are strongly positively correlated with the families’ per capita income (both in the case of
earnings with a high school and with a college degree). One possible explanation is that
richer families have networks that provide better job opportunities. Parental income might
also proxy for skills of the child, such as cognitive and non-cognitive skills (e.g. motivation,
perseverance etc) that are favorable to higher earnings. Mothers’ education is not a signifi-
cant predictor of earnings expectations, even though it is positively correlated with realized
earnings.
Our analysis shows that there is a considerable amount of heterogeneity in expectations.
This still holds after controlling for individual and family background characteristics, which
reflects the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in terms of perceptions about cognitive
and social skills and differences in information sets e.g. about skill prices.24
To conclude, the evidence of this section suggests that our sample of Mexican youths
understand the expectation questions and give meaningful answers. Both boys and girls
expect high returns to college in the labor market and perceive that unemployment and
earnings risk decrease with higher education.
Even though the goal of this section was not to show how rational or well-informed
people are (or how people form expectations), but only to give the reader an idea about
how expectations compare to observed earnings and how they correlate with individual
characteristics, we can tentatively conclude the following: We do not find clear evidence that
girls are less well-informed about potential labor market outcomes. First, girls’ perceived
earnings uncertainty (i.e. the perceived standard deviation of log earnings based on the
elicited individual distribution of earnings) is comparable to the one of boys. Second, girls’
expectations about earnings are of a similar order of magnitude as observed earnings (as is
the case for boys). Third, girls’ expectations vary with characteristics in a way one would
expect.
24An alternative explanation is that the remaining “heterogeneity” reflects noise. But we show that
subjective expectations are able to predict schooling choices even after controlling for an extensive set
of individual and family background characteristics. This suggests that at least part of the heterogeneity
captures factors unobserved to the researcher, such as skills and information about skill prices, which influence
earnings expectations.
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Table C.1: Expected Earnings and Observed Census Earnings
Boys Girls
Exp Earn Return Exp Earn Return
Mean/(SD) Mean/(SD) Mean/(SD) Mean/(SD)
Exp Log Earnings
- Senior HS 7.633 7.532
(0.471) (0.516)
- College 8.288 0.655 8.272 0.734
(0.461) (0.358) (0.496) (0.436)
Log Census Earnings
- Senior HS 7.661 7.462
(0.302) (0.323)
- College 8.140 0.486 8.048 0.599
(0.309) (0.375) (0.252) (0.407)
Observations 269 404
Table C.2: Correlation between Expected (Realized) Earnings and Individual and Family
Background Characteristics
Dependent Variable Realized Log Earnings Expected Log Earnings
Data Source (Mexican Census) (Jovenes Data)
High School College High School College
Male 0.024*** 0.036*** 0.087* 0.013
(0.005) (0.004) (0.045) (0.044)
Mother’s Educ - Jun HS 0.149*** 0.129*** -0.065 -0.018
(0.008) (0.005) (0.060) (0.058)
Mother’s Educ - Sen HS 0.355*** 0.171*** 0.077 0.011
(0.013) (0.006) (0.108) (0.105)
Per Cap Income - 5 to 10k 0.804*** 0.689*** 0.125** 0.081*
(0.020) (0.008) (0.049) (0.047)
Per Cap Income - more than 10k 0.340*** 0.347*** 0.177*** 0.121**
(0.011) (0.007) (0.055) (0.054)
Observations 81596 171910 1237 1237
Censored Obs 564 564
R-squared (Chi-Squared) 0.088 0.079 17.741 11.369
Lambda 0.051 0.040
S.E. (Lambda) 0.145 0.141
Notes: Table displays coefficients and standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Excl. categories: female, mother’s education
primary or less, lowest per capita parental income category.
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D Tables complementing main analysis
Table D.1: First-stage Regression for Whether the Youth Responds Herself
Dep Var: Youth Respondent: Yes/No
Instruments 1 Instruments 2 Instr and Controls
Coeff/(SE) Coeff/(SE) Coeff/(SE)
Interview Evening of Weekday -0.284* -0.344* -0.294*
(0.155) (0.177) (0.177)
Interview Evening 0.280* 0.365** 0.318**
(0.143) (0.157) (0.157)
Interview Week 40 to 42 0.126*** 0.175*** 0.169***
(0.029) (0.039) (0.039)
Male -0.091*** -0.048 0.303
(0.028) (0.036) (0.277)
Interview Evening Weekday * Male 0.340 0.265
(0.401) (0.399)
Interview Evening * Male -0.404 -0.327
(0.384) (0.382)
Interview Week 40 to 42 * Male -0.106* -0.078
(0.059) (0.059)
GPA Jr HS * Male -0.002
(0.003)
GPA Jr HS * Female 0.003
(0.002)
Number of Siblings * Male -0.039***
(0.013)
Number of Siblings * Female -0.028**
(0.011)
No Father in Household * Male 0.072
(0.052)
No Father in Household * Female 0.017
(0.046)
Mother’s Educ - Jr HS * Male 0.002
(0.057)
Mother’s Educ - Jr HS * Female -0.083
(0.051)
Per cap Income - below 5k * Male 0.011
(0.054)
Per cap Income - below 5k * Female 0.124**
(0.049)
Sex Ratio (HS) * Male 0.057*
(0.035)
Sex Ratio (HS) * Female -0.001
(0.030)
Observations 1237 1237 1237
F-Statistik 8.270 5.414 3.280
R-Squared 0.026 0.030 0.059
Adjusted R-Squared 0.023 0.024 0.041
Notes: Table displays coefficients and standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Excl. categories: mother’s education primary
or less, per capita income less than 5000 pesos. The last specification includes state dummies, which are also interacted with the gender dummy.
xi
Table D.2: College Attendance Choice: Labor Market and Marriage Market (using expected
returns)
Dependent Variable College Attendance Decision
Marriage Proxy 1 Marriage Proxy 2
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Without Labor Market Expectations
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women (Sr HS) -0.150
(0.138)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men (Sr HS) 0.176*
(0.098)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women -0.755*
(0.455)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men 0.580**
(0.280)
Controls for Ind. and Background Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (Censored) 1237 (564) 1237 (564)
Log Likelihood -1170.670 -1170.384
Sample Sel: Corr of Errors (P-Val) -0.330 (0.504) -0.387 (0.404)
With Labor Market Expectations
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women (Sr HS) -0.147
(0.136)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men (Sr HS) 0.177*
(0.100)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women -0.596
(0.453)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men 0.646**
(0.282)
Expected Return - College 0.748*** 0.280* 0.721*** 0.280*
(0.247) (0.158) (0.248) (0.156)
Controls for Prob. of Work and Var. of Log Earn Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Ind. and Background Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (Censored) 1237 (564) 1237 (564)
Log Likelihood -1172.237 -1173.297
Sample Sel: Corr of Errors (P-Val) -0.220 (0.672) -0.205 (0.706)
Notes: Table displays coefficients and standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Excl. categories: father in household, mother’s
education primary or less, per capita income between 5000 and 10000 pesos.
xii
Table D.3: College Attendance Choice: Labor and Marriage Market - Local Labor Market
Conditions (using expected returns)
Dependent Variable College Attendance Decision
Marriage Proxy 1 Marriage Proxy 2
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Peer Effects
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women (Sr HS) -0.101
(0.147)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men (Sr HS) 0.210**
(0.107)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women -0.510
(0.477)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men 0.609**
(0.295)
Expected Return - College 0.779*** 0.339** 0.763*** 0.331**
(0.248) (0.166) (0.250) (0.164)
Frac of Coll Educ Men (Women) 1.454 3.395*** 1.327 2.901**
(1.224) (1.220) (1.219) (1.219)
Controls for Ind. and Background Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Prob. of Work and Var. of Log Earn Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (Censored) 1237 (564) 1237 (564)
Log Likelihood -1155.427 -1156.388
Sample Sel: Corr of Errors (P-Val) -0.153 (0.776) -0.213 (0.676)
Local Labor Market Conditions
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women (Sr HS) -0.131
(0.156)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men (Sr HS) 0.199*
(0.109)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women -0.807
(0.534)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men 0.679**
(0.317)
Expected Return - College 0.849*** 0.354** 0.835*** 0.358**
(0.255) (0.168) (0.255) (0.168)
Frac of Coll Educ Men (Women) 0.775 3.624*** 0.535 3.279**
(1.343) (1.302) (1.357) (1.299)
Average Census Earnings - HS 0.199 -0.001 0.212* -0.002
(0.126) (0.037) (0.127) (0.038)
Average Census Earnings - Coll -0.016 0.005 -0.019 -0.021
(0.032) (0.069) (0.033) (0.070)
Partial/Unempl Rate - HS -0.012 0.002 -0.014 -0.002
(0.017) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008)
Partial/Unempl Rate - Coll -0.034* -0.014 -0.036** -0.017
(0.018) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011)
Controls for Ind. and Background Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Prob. of Work and Var. of Log Earn Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (Censored) 1237 (564) 1237 (564)
Log Likelihood -1146.987 -1147.026
Sample Sel: Corr of Errors (P-Val) 0.067 (0.913) -0.013 (0.981)
Notes: Table displays coefficients and standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Excl. categories: father in household, mother’s
education primary or less, per capita income between 5000 and 10000 pesos.
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E Robustness checks
Full Jovenes sample versus matched Jovenes sample: As discussed in section 3.5,
when matching our data from the Jovenes survey with Mexican Census data to construct
marriage market proxies and to control for local labor market conditions, we unfortunately
lose a substantial fraction of our data, since the Census did not survey all of the (relatively
small) localities in which individuals from the Jovenes sample live.
In section 4.2 we compared summary statistics of the subjective expectations and of the
characteristics of the individuals in the matched and the unmatched sample and found that
labor market expectations and college enrollment rates are similar for the two samples, but
that individuals from the subsample that could be matched with the Census (and on which
our analysis relies) are from somewhat more privileged families, in particular in terms of
higher per capita income.
To test whether our results are more generally applicable we conduct the following two
robustness tests. First, we test whether our results also hold for the poorer half of our
sample (i.e. for those that are underrepresented in our matched sample compared to the
Jovenes sample), i.e. we run the regression on labor market expectations and marriage
markes proxies for individuals from families with below median per capita income. The
upper panel of Table E.1 shows that results are very similar for this subsample. Coefficients
on expected log earnings are of the same magnitude as before (for girls even slightly higher)
and still mostly significant (some of the coefficients are slightly less significant due to the fact
that we need to rely on only around 350 uncensored observations). Coefficients on marriage
market proxies are even larger for this subsample and significant for girls on 5% and 10%.
Second, we test whether our results also hold for individuals from smaller localities, since
the Census did not survey all of the (relatively small) localities in which individuals from
the Jovenes sample live. As can be seen from the lower panel of Table E.1, results are again
very similar for individuals from localities with less than 20,000 inhabitants. Coefficients on
expected log earnings are of similar magnitude and significant for boys, while coefficients on
marriage market proxies remain unchanged in size and significance for girls.
These robustness tests provide further evidence that our results are valid for Mexican
youths from relatively disadvantaged families who graduated from high school.
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Table E.1: College Attendance Choice: Robustness Matched versus Full Jovenes Sample
Dependent Variable College Attendance Decision
Marriage Proxy 1 Marriage Proxy 2
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Poor Households (Income Below Median)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women (Sr HS) -0.053
(0.188)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men (Sr HS) 0.340**
(0.141)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women -0.808
(0.682)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men 0.639*
(0.386)
Exp Log Earn - HS -0.845* -0.412 -0.907*** -0.519**
(0.493) (0.302) (0.347) (0.236)
Exp Log Earn - Coll 0.536 0.317 0.600* 0.387
(0.375) (0.249) (0.354) (0.244)
Prob of Work - HS 0.346 0.637 0.463 0.764
(0.703) (0.711) (0.766) (0.676)
Prob of Work - Coll -0.201 -0.604 -0.229 -0.725
(0.864) (0.829) (0.911) (0.857)
Var of Log Earn - HS 8.237 4.412 11.182 11.052
(14.588) (12.165) (16.335) (12.255)
Var of Log Earn - Coll -1.743 18.902 -3.142 18.290
(23.155) (16.461) (26.065) (17.334)
Controls for Ind. and Background Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (Censored) 688 (316) 688 (316)
Log Likelihood -642.399 -643.385
Sample Sel: Corr of Errors (P-Val) -0.580 ( 0.592) 0.063 (0.957 )
Households in Small Loc (Below 20,000)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women (Sr HS) -0.054
(0.130)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men (Sr HS) 0.171*
(0.087)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women -0.496
(0.488)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men 0.513*
(0.305)
Exp Log Earn - HS -0.760*** -0.249 -1.029*** -0.280
(0.224) (0.155) (0.315) (0.198)
Exp Log Earn - Coll 0.417* 0.222 0.636** 0.312
(0.242) (0.163) (0.317) (0.211)
Prob of Work - HS 0.343 -0.122 0.641 -0.214
(0.617) (0.455) (0.841) (0.553)
Prob of Work - Coll -0.733 -0.019 -0.956 0.304
(0.665) (0.536) (0.866) (0.664)
Var of Log Earn - HS 16.101 13.690* 23.640 20.523*
(10.169) (7.620) (14.798) (11.842)
Var of Log Earn - Coll 1.093 -7.161 -3.078 -7.722
(15.220) (13.543) (23.302) (16.538)
Controls for Ind. and Background Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (Censored) 866 (392) 866 (392)
Log Likelihood -792.531 -800.596
Sample Sel: Corr of Errors (P-Val) -0.529 ( 0.481) -0.037 (0.946 )
Notes: Table displays coefficients and standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Excl. categories: father in household, mother’s
education primary or less.
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Interactions of expectations: Table E.2 displays results in which we include interaction
terms between expected log earnings of college and high school with the probability of
working conditional on a college and high school degree. We find that the interaction terms
are never significant (all p-values are above 0.9). Coefficients on expected log earnings for
college and high school are somewhat larger in absolute values (compared to excluding the
interaction) and have the expected signs, but standard errors are now so large that they
are not significant at conventional levels. Coefficients on the marriage market proxies are
unchanged in terms of magnitude and significance, i.e. the two proxies are still significant
for girls but not for boys. Given these findings we focus in our main analysis on a linear
and additively separable specification, since interaction terms are not significant and leaving
them out does not bias coefficients on the main variables of interest, namely labor market
expectations and marriage market proxies (nor on other variables).
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Table E.2: College Attendance Choice: Relevance of Interaction Terms
Dependent Variable College Attendance Decision
Marriage Proxy 1 Marriage Proxy 2
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women (Sr HS) -0.140
(0.136)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men (Sr HS) 0.180*
(0.100)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women -0.496
(0.448)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men 0.553*
(0.288)
Exp Log Earn - HS -0.920 -0.558 -0.754 -0.554
(0.802) (0.548) (0.791) (0.540)
Exp Log Earn - Coll 0.780 0.777 0.696 0.747
(0.838) (0.663) (0.824) (0.652)
Prob of Work - HS -1.207 -2.516 0.201 -2.464
(8.386) (5.645) (8.277) (5.567)
Prob of Work - Coll -0.211 6.139 -0.770 5.726
(8.162) (6.591) (8.018) (6.479)
Prob Work * Exp Log Earn - HS 0.188 0.385 -0.001 0.379
(1.112) (0.749) (1.098) (0.739)
Prob Work * Exp Log Earn - Coll -0.022 -0.720 0.053 -0.666
(1.007) (0.800) (0.990) (0.786)
Var of Log Earn - HS 10.405 12.004 11.110 14.376
(11.764) (10.063) (11.699) (9.883)
Var of Log Earn - Coll -2.149 -7.171 -3.171 -6.306
(18.873) (13.389) (18.537) (13.207)
Controls for Ind and Background Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1237 1237
Censored Obs 564 564
Log Likelihood -1157.716 -1158.512
Sample Sel: Corr of Errors -0.427 -0.471
P-val: LR Test of Indep Eqns 0.326 0.275
Notes: Table displays coefficients and standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Excl. categories: father in household, mother’s
education primary or less, per capita income between 5000 and 10000 pesos.
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Different measure of unemployment: Table E.3 presents results controlling for local
unemployment rates instead of controlling for the local unemployment and partial employ-
ment rate. The latter is our preferred measure, since unemployment rates are generally very
low (everybody works) and there is less variation in the unemployment rate compared to
the unemployment and partial work rate. Table E.2 shows that results are unchanged when
using one or the other measure of (un)employment (for the construction of the local labor
market variables, see section 3.6).
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Table E.3: College Attendance Choice: Labor and Marriage Market - Local Labor Market
Conditions (Unemployment Rate)
Dependent Variable College Attendance Decision
Marriage Proxy 1 Marriage Proxy 2
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women (Sr HS) -0.124
(0.143)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men (Sr HS) 0.228**
(0.108)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women -0.594
(0.496)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men 0.604**
(0.301)
Expected Return - Coll 0.771*** 0.347** 0.755*** 0.347**
(0.253) (0.171) (0.255) (0.170)
Prob of Work - HS -0.090 0.400 -0.075 0.426
(0.628) (0.488) (0.627) (0.487)
Prob of Work - Coll -0.531 0.326 -0.447 0.295
(0.647) (0.599) (0.646) (0.592)
Var of Log Earn - HS 5.860 14.201 7.882 17.350
(12.697) (10.736) (12.781) (10.568)
Var of Log Earn - Coll -4.987 -6.908 -7.053 -6.855
(19.991) (14.411) (19.910) (14.370)
Frac of Coll Educ Men (Women) 1.106 3.028** 0.936 2.752**
(1.403) (1.305) (1.406) (1.302)
Average Census Earn - HS 0.228* 0.000 0.238* 0.001
(0.126) (0.036) (0.126) (0.036)
Average Census Earn - Coll -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 -0.041
(0.032) (0.071) (0.032) (0.071)
Unempl Rate - HS -0.097 0.008 -0.089 0.007
(0.064) (0.038) (0.065) (0.037)
Unempl Rate - Coll -0.024 0.094* -0.027 0.079*
(0.056) (0.048) (0.058) (0.047)
Controls for Ind and Background Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1233 1233
Censored Obs 563 563
Log Likelihood -1143.720 -1144.456
Sample Sel: Corr of Errors -0.199 -0.253
P-val: LR Test of Indep Eqns 0.701 0.609
Notes: Table displays coefficients and standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Excl. categories: father in household, mother’s
education primary or less, per capita income between 5000 and 10000 pesos.
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Marriage market proxies and robustness concerning age range: In Table E.4 we
show results using different age ranges to construct our marriage market proxies. In addition
to constructing the sex ratio of unmarried men to women based on individuals between 18
and 30 (i.e. individuals of the same age or older than the youths whose college decision we
analyze), we also construct sex ratios based on unmarried women and men between age 16
and 25 (see section 3.5). Table E.4 shows that our results are robust to different age ranges
and estimated coefficients on the sex ratio and on expected log earnings are very similar.
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Table E.4: College Attendance Choice: Marriage Market Proxies (Robustness Age Range)
Dependent Variable College Attendance Decision
Marriage Proxy 1 Marriage Proxy 2
Age 18-30 Age 16-25 Age 18-30 Age 16-25
Boys
Expected Return - Coll * Male 0.748*** 0.716*** 0.721*** 0.722***
(0.247) (0.249) (0.248) (0.250)
Prob of Work - HS * Male 0.041 0.032 0.073 0.081
(0.570) (0.554) (0.564) (0.575)
Prob of Work - College * Male -0.527 -0.517 -0.425 -0.385
(0.601) (0.582) (0.594) (0.605)
Var of Log Earn - HS * Male 6.695 6.307 8.827 9.506
(11.403) (11.025) (11.404) (11.629)
Var of Log Earn - Coll * Male 0.023 0.038 -2.279 -2.212
(18.523) (17.886) (18.290) (18.632)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women (HS) -0.147 -0.143
(0.136) (0.151)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women -0.596 -0.708
(0.453) (0.478)
Girls
Expected Return - Coll * Female 0.280* 0.259* 0.280* 0.287*
(0.158) (0.156) (0.156) (0.158)
Prob of Work - HS * Female 0.438 0.420 0.428 0.449
(0.462) (0.449) (0.458) (0.466)
Prob of Work - College * Female 0.352 0.339 0.334 0.289
(0.554) (0.536) (0.546) (0.555)
Var of Log Earn - HS * Female 12.988 12.474 15.462 16.130
(10.275) (10.001) (10.033) (10.132)
Var of Log Earn - Coll * Female -5.951 -6.118 -5.803 -5.088
(13.426) (12.976) (13.205) (13.424)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men (HS) 0.177* 0.176*
(0.100) (0.098)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men 0.646** 0.734**
(0.282) (0.336)
Observations 1237 1237 1237 1237
Censored Obs 564 564 564 564
Log Likelihood -1160.461 -1155.942 -1160.137 -1159.004
Sample Sel: Corr of Errors -0.402 -0.503 -0.457 -0.401
P-val: LR Test of Indep Eqns 0.390 0.302 0.310 0.390
Notes: Table displays coefficients and standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Excl. categories: father in household, mother’s
education primary or less, per capita income between 5000 and 10000 pesos.
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Relevance of marriage market proxy in large localities: As an additional robustness
check, we test whether the local sex ratio has a smaller impact in larger localities. Since those
are more likely to contain a university, individuals would not have to move to a different
city to go to college. In fact, most of our sample lives in relatively small localities (70%
live in localities with less than 20,000 inhabitants, 80% in localities with less than 50,000
inhabitants), while less than 4% live in cities with more than 500,000 people. To have
enough power to be able to detect any potential effect, we therefore restrict our sample to
individuals living in localities of more than 50,000 inhabitants (even though these are still
not very large). Table E.5 shows that coefficients on the sex ratio (conditional on education
and unconditionally) are indeed not significant in larger localities.
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Table E.5: College Attendance Choice: Robustness Larger Cities
Dependent Variable College Attendance Decision
Marriage Proxy 1 Marriage Proxy 2
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Expected Return - Col 1.043* 0.386 0.967* 0.348
(0.615) (0.304) (0.502) (0.225)
Prob of Work - HS -1.157 0.341 -1.069 -0.049
(1.282) (0.737) (1.020) (0.625)
Prob of Work - Coll 0.117 1.477 0.363 1.427
(1.458) (1.184) (1.165) (0.988)
Var of Log Earn - HS -3.750 -9.169 -8.906 -5.194
(21.997) (21.421) (17.543) (15.473)
Var of Log Earn - Coll -45.699 -11.108 -51.663 -7.540
(44.027) (20.038) (32.487) (15.943)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women (Sr HS) -1.044
(0.893)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men (Sr HS) 0.481
(0.461)
Ratio of Unmarried Men to Women -2.244
(2.228)
Ratio of Unmarried Women to Men 0.287
(1.402)
Frac of Coll Educ Men (Women) 1.119 4.448 0.893 2.775
(3.074) (3.120) (2.557) (2.760)
Average Census Earn - HS 0.055 0.268 0.010 0.185
(0.265) (0.209) (0.228) (0.162)
Average Census Earn - Coll -0.044 -0.968 -0.039 -0.722
(0.046) (0.604) (0.034) (0.525)
Partial/Unempl Rate - HS 0.030 -0.019 0.021 -0.020
(0.081) (0.030) (0.071) (0.028)
Partial/Unempl Rate - Coll -0.249** 0.111 -0.207** 0.064
(0.112) (0.082) (0.091) (0.068)
Controls for Ind. and Background Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (Censored) 371 (172) 371 (172)
Log Likelihood -319.328 -322.425
Sample Sel: Corr of Errors (P-Val) -0.287 (0.576) -0.353 (0.486)
Notes: Table displays coefficients and standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Excl. categories: father in household, mother’s
education primary or less, per capita income between 5000 and 10000 pesos. We focus on localities with more than 50,000 inhabitants (even
though many are still relatively small), because more than 80% of individuals live in localities with below than 50,000 inhabitants (less than 4%
in localities with more than 500,000 inhabitants).
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F Ex-post rationalization
To test the possibility that our respondents answer the expected return questions to justify
ex-post their choices, since the survey on expectations was conducted two-three months after
the schooling decision, we conduct the test that we discussed in Section 3.2. In particular,
we compare the cross-section of expected earnings for our cohort of interest (i.e. students
who had just graduated from senior high school before the survey) with a cohort that is one
year younger (and thus just starting grade 12). If individuals rationalize their choices, we
would expect the following pattern: Individuals who decided to enrol in college rationalize
their choice by stating higher expected college earnings or lower high school earnings. Those
individuals who decided not to enrol state lower college earnings (or higher high school
earnings). This would lead to a cross-sectional distribution of expected earnings and returns
that is more spread out for the cohort of senior high school graduates who have decided
already, compared to the distribution of the cohort that is one year younger and just starting
grade 12.25 The same reasoning holds for perceptions of the probability of working and
perceptions of earnings risk.
To test for differences between the distribution of expectations of those two adjacent
cohorts, we use a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is a nonparametric test for the equality
of continuous, one-dimensional probability distributions. The null hypothesis is that the
cross-sectional distribution of -for example- expected returns is the same for the sample of
senior high school graduates and the sample of a cohort that is one year younger and just
starting grade 12.
In Appendix Table F.1 we report p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests separately by
gender for the different measures of subjective expectations, i.e. for expected earnings for
different schooling scenarios, expected returns and perceived risks. We find that the distri-
bution of expectations is the same for the senior high school graduates themselves compared
to the cohort that is one year younger. We never reject equality of distributions apart from
one instance, that is girls’ perceptions about the probability of working with a senior high
school degree. In that case the distribution of the older cohort is not more spread out,
but some of the older girls seem to have updated their beliefs about probability of working
upward compared to the one-year younger cohort (see Appendix Figure F.1). At the same
time, this is not driving any of our results because in any case girls’ perceptions about the
probability of working are never significant in the college attendance choice regression. The
other instance where we come close to rejecting equality of distributions is for girls’ expec-
tations about college earnings (p-val 0.112). In that case the distribution of the older cohort
25As discussed in section 3.2, this is true unless people switch positions in the distribution in such a way
that the resulting cross-section looks exactly the same as before. This can only be the case if people with low
expected returns to college decide to enrol in college and now state high returns to college and vice versa.
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of senior high school graduates is actually more compressed (instead of more spread out),
contrary to what one should expect in the case ex-post justification (see Appendix Figure
F.2).26
Table F.1: College Attendance Choice: Rationalization of Choices
P-Val of KS-Test
Boys Girls
Exp Log Earnings
- Senior HS 0.495 0.714
- College 0.826 0.112
Exp Return
- College 0.211 0.142
Prob of Work
- Senior HS 0.906 0.003
- College 0.995 0.165
Log Var of Earnings
- Senior HS 0.204 0.638
- College 0.369 0.142
Observations
(Sen HS Grads/Grade 12) 269/212 404/257
Notes: Table displays the p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality of distributions. The null hypothesis is that the cross-sectional
distribution of -for example- expected returns is the same for the sample of senior high school graduates (whose schooling decision we are analyzing)
and the sample of a cohort that is one year younger and just starting grade 12 (who have thus not decided yet about whether to enrol in college
or not).
26We illustrate graphically only the two instances, in which distributions are (close to) significantly differ-
ent. The other graphs can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Figure F.1: Comparing Expectations of Senior High School Graduates with a One-Year
Younger Cohort: Probability of Working with a College Degree
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Notes: In this figure we illustrate the cross-sectional distribution of the probability of working with a college degree, comparing our cohort of
analysis, the senior high school graduates, with a cohort that is one year younger (for boys and girls respectively).
Figure F.2: Comparing Expectations of Senior High School Graduates with a One-Year
Younger Cohort: Expected College Earnings
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Notes: In this figure we illustrate the cross-sectional distribution of expected college earnings, comparing our cohort of analysis, the senior high
school graduates, with a cohort that is one year younger (for boys and girls respectively).
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